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PREFACE 
Whenever we do research, we carry along large sets of 
assumptions, often tacitly and often without much critical 
reflection. These assumptions are a form of imagination, 
and they consist of images of social actions and the contexts 
in which they are situated, all of which we presume to be 
adequately represented and enacted in the empirical data we 
examine and, by implication, validating the actual ways we 
examine such data. Since these sets of assumptions are often 
shared by large bodies of researchers, they also identify and 
define disciplines, schools and trends of scholarship – again 
often tacitly and without being made too often into objects of 
inquiry in their own right.
In this book, I shall engage with such deeply rooted, 
widespread and defining assumptions in a very broad field of 
studies of language-in-society, for which I propose to use the label 
of ‘sociolinguistics’ as an ad hoc shorthand, mainly for reasons 
of editorial parsimony but also for more substantial reasons. 
My own work over three decades has been performed under a 
variety of labels, from ‘pragmatics’ and ‘discourse analysis’, via 
‘literacy studies’, ‘narrative studies’, ‘linguistic landscape studies’, 
‘social media studies’, ‘educational linguistics’ and ‘linguistic 
ethnography’, to ‘sociolinguistics’ and ‘linguistic anthropology’ 
(with an occasional foray into ‘linguistics’ and ‘literary studies’). 
It was held together, in spite of its diversity, by a central concern 
about the complex place of language in society, the dialectics 
that tied language and society together, and the difficulties of 
decoding, understanding and explaining such ties – a central 
concern which is fundamentally ‘ sociolinguistic’, if you wish. 
AQ: Per 
OED, 
‘ad hoc’ 
and other 
standard 
non-English 
words are 
unhyphen-
ated even 
when used 
as adjec-
tives.
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My choice of ‘sociolinguistic’ as the ad hoc label here, therefore, 
points to the fact that I wish to address assumptions that direct 
and guide work addressing, in a wide variety of ways, the ties 
between language and society. And this, of course, makes this a 
work of theory. But two qualifications are in order.
First qualification: theory, in my view, is in no sense 
definitive; it is merely an intermediary stage in a longitudinal 
process of knowledge development. It is a stage where ‘the 
concepts, postulates and premises [are being] straightened 
out’, after which, to quote Gregory Bateson’s fine lines, 
analysts will be able to embark on a new and still more 
fruitful orgy of loose thinking, until they reach a stage at 
which again the results of their thinking must be strictly 
conceptualized. (Bateson 1972: 87) 
Bateson put a premium on this ‘combination of loose and strict 
thinking’ which he saw as ‘the most precious tool of science’ 
(1972: 75). Scientists need the messiness and chaos of actual 
confrontations with empirical cases and data in order to 
arrive at systematic theories, which then must again be used in 
‘loose’ practices of scientific problem-solving. As for the latter, 
their very looseness ‘allows us to discover phenomena whose 
existence we were unaware of at the beginning of the research’ 
(Becker et al. 1961: 18). The looseness, thus, enables the critical 
fact-checking of theories. The theories I shall present here will 
be most useful if they are used in that sense: as moments of 
‘strict thinking’ in between moments of actual problem-
solving which can confirm, defy or amend them. They were 
not written for eternity.
For this is the second qualification: theory is a tool from 
and for research. This may sound self-explanatory, but it 
is not: there is a terrific amount of theory available that is 
presented as a self-contained intellectual product, to be solely 
addressed as theory. Not here. Whatever theory I have to offer 
has its feet firmly in very large amounts of empirical research; 
it represents a moment of ‘strict thinking’ in an ongoing 
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research process, and it must be fed back to it. Why do we need 
it then? To quote Anselm Strauss, we need theory to ‘stimulate 
your imagination as well as suggest research directions to 
you’ (Strauss 1993: 50). The imaginative dimension of theory, 
Strauss argued, can help us 
by enhancing sensitivities to what otherwise might be 
overlooked; it raises astute questions … that might not 
be raised; and it can minimize becoming captive to overly 
simple explanatory models, or doctrines, that are claimed 
as interpreting or explaining human life and behavior. 
(1993: 49)
Rather than constraining thought, I see theory (as understood 
here) as liberating, as a tool that enables us to explore further 
and think what has not been thought before. The theories that 
enable such liberating creativity must naturally be its first 
victims. But as I said, they were not written for eternity.
The kinds of research on which my theoretical statements 
are based are sociolinguistic in the sense specified above; 
the research directions they might suggest, however, are not 
confined to sociolinguistics but should be influenced by it. 
In this book, I look at society through the lens of language 
and interaction; the things we, as sociolinguists, have come to 
know about how humans interact by means of continuously 
expanding and changing language-communicative resources, 
can serve as a take-off point for looking at how society-at-large 
moves, changes, develops. This is the core assumption in this 
book: that sociolinguistic insights have far wider relevance, 
that they constitute a tremendous asset for innovative social 
thought, and are ready to be deployed in a very wide range of 
research efforts in social sciences and humanities.
While I have written this book in the strictest solitude and 
as a process of reflexive critique, it is and remains, of course, 
the fruit of dialogue – an intense collaborative dialogue 
I have maintained with a large community of colleagues, 
research partners and friends. Much of what it contains was 
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raised as a topic of discussion with consecutive generations 
of PhD researchers – as informal seminars or as direct 
targeted dialogue on specific analytical issues – and with close 
colleagues in my own institution, the InCoLaS consortium, and 
further afield. I avoid listing names here, for the list would be 
extraordinarily long (and still necessarily incomplete). Many 
friends, colleagues, partners and students will know that they 
are included in these opaque lines, and to many others I should 
say: when in doubt, consider yourself addressed and gratefully 
acknowledged for the inspiration I received from you. 
In a more practical way, this book owes its smooth and 
painless birth due to Gurdeep Mattu of Bloomsbury, who 
‘discovered’ the draft version and offered me the excellent 
publishing support of his team, and to my ‘executive editor’ 
Karin Berkhout, who, as so often, made sure that a pile of 
paper turned into a book manuscript. I thank both for their 
contributions to this project.
Antwerp, June 2017
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CHAPTER ONE
Sociolinguists as 
sociologists
Over two decades ago, the Welsh sociologist Glyn Williams 
(1992) wrote a devastating review of the sociological 
underpinnings of the sociolinguistics of his day.1 His findings 
were (not to put too fine a point on it) that sociolinguistics 
was often a combination of very good and even avant-garde 
linguistics with conventional sociology. So, while sociolinguists 
appeared as leaders and innovators in the field of advanced 
linguistic analysis, they would be mere followers in the field 
of sociological reflection, happy to adopt, often implicitly and 
without much questioning or motivation, mainstream forms of 
‘sociological imagination’ (cf. Mills 1959). This led to images 
of society characterized by social integration, social consensus 
and cooperation, the relative stability of social relations and 
identities, and clearly delineated national units and group 
identities as circumscriptions for analysis – recipes from the 
kitchen of Talcott Parsons, according to Glyn Williams.
It is certainly true that sociolinguists have largely avoided 
discussing major theoretical issues in sociology and social 
science, and have been extremely prudent in explaining the big 
sociological issues that may emerge from their work.2 This is a 
great pity, since contemporary sociolinguistic work does often 
yield insights that are challenging mainstream sociological 
assumptions, and do so at a fundamental level – the level at 
Durkheim and the Internet Sociolinguists as sociologists
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which, to quote C. Wright Mills (1959: 5), ‘the framework 
of modern society is sought, and within that framework the 
psychologies of a variety of men and women are formulated’, 
the level, in short, at which we can form a ‘sociological re-
imagination’, a re-imagination of our fundamental conceptions 
of humans and their social lives. In this text, I intend to 
undertake a modest attempt in that direction.
The main motive driving this attempt has already been 
given: contemporary sociolinguistics is sociologically relevant. 
And the reason behind this can be picked up quickly while 
reading sociological classics: they invariably refer to patterns 
of interaction as fundamental to whatever is understood by 
social relationships, social structure or social process – and 
usually also grant great importance to this. To quote just one of 
them, this is how Georg Simmel defined the task of sociology:
Sociology asks what happens to men and by what rules 
they behave, not insofar as they unfold their understandable 
individual existences in their totalities, but insofar as they 
form groups and are determined by their group existence 
because of interaction. (Simmel 1950: 11, emphasis added)
Yet, with a mere handful of exceptions, they pay hardly any at-
tention to the actual nature and features of such patterns of in-
teraction.3 Sociolinguists do just that, it is our profession. And 
systematic attention to communicative modes and processes, 
we shall see, has the potential to reveal the weakness of certain 
commonly adopted sociological assumptions and conclusions. 
It is my conviction that the ‘socio’ in ‘sociolinguistics’ involves 
the responsibility to work from language towards society. 
What eventually needs to be clarified and explained, through 
the analysis of sociolinguistic processes, is society and how 
humans operate in it and construct it. This becomes increas-
ingly pressing as our field of study is changing from ‘offline’ 
communication in a precisely circumscribed social space to in-
clude rapidly evolving and changing delocalized ‘online’ com-
munication in superdiverse environments, with well-recorded 
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challenges to established analytical frameworks. I want to 
encourage my fellow sociolinguists to take that responsibility 
seriously: we do have something to say that transcends the 
narrow confines of our own field of inquiry, and we should 
say it. Sociolinguists are, whether they like it or not, special-
ized sociologists.4
In my attempt, I will use Emile Durkheim’s work as my 
point of departure. Why? Not just because of its pervasive 
influence on Parsons. From reading Durkheim’s work, I 
found that his lasting influence across a broad swath of 
social and human sciences is often underestimated. It is in his 
work that the fundamental imagery of Man and society was 
constructed that became the perimeter, so to speak, within 
which twentieth-century social thought moved and developed. 
And even if later scholars dismissed his work or claimed to be 
free of his influence, they still adopted some of its fundamental 
principles. We’re all, in many and often surprising ways, still 
Durkheimians.5 And after extracting some relevant points 
from Durkheim’s work in Chapter 2, I intend to work with 
Durkheim in two different ways in Chapters 3 and 4. 
One, in support of Durkheim, I wish to add to, and refine, 
a notion he saw as absolutely foundational for sociology as a 
science: le fait social, the social fact. This notion, when Dur-
kheim first formulated it, was highly contested (to the extent 
that Durkheim spent most of the preface to the second edi-
tion of Les Règles de la Méthode Sociologique defending and 
clarifying it; Durkheim [1895] 2010). It was also rejected in 
what came to be known as Rational Choice Theory and, more 
generally, it clashed with the tradition of Methodological 
 Individualism. The notion of social fact, of course, determines 
the possibility of a definition of ‘the social’ as a sphere of phe-
nomena and processes that cannot be reduced to constituent 
parts without losing much of their essence. Thus, it also under-
lies the very possibility of a sociology and a sociolinguistics. A 
highly precise and analytically powerful view of the social fact 
is possible if we excerpt some advanced sociolinguistic work, 
which I shall argue in Chapter 3.
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Two, we need also to step away from Durkheim and the 
world he tried to make sense of and consider our own. There are 
things now that Durkheim could not possibly have known or 
predicted, and contemporary sociolinguistic work on internet 
phenomena raises several entirely new fundamental questions 
about the nature of social groups, social relations and social 
processes and permits new hypotheses in these domains. By 
combining this second exercise with the first one, we arrive 
in Chapter 4 at a number of fundamental propositions – at 
theory, in other words – that may contribute to work in several 
other disciplines, and that have been generated inductively 
by detailed empirical attention to the facts of language, 
interaction, communication, of which we know that they are 
absolutely central to any social phenomenon. Or at least: let’s 
try to establish that.6
Notes
1 In this text, I shall use the term ‘sociolinguistics’ as a broadly 
descriptive umbrella term including any approach in which the 
connections between language and society are systematically 
explored and in which communication is seen as an activity 
not reducible to the production of cognitive content. Work 
to be discussed in what follows might, consequently, more 
conventionally be labelled as linguistic anthropology, pragmatics, 
applied linguistics, discourse analysis and so forth – and 
disciplinary sociolinguistics.
2 There are some notable exceptions; see, for example, Fairclough 
1992; Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999; Coupland 2016; Flores, 
Spotti and Garcia 2017; Perez-Milans 2017.
3 Some of the exceptions are reviewed in John B. Thompson’s 
(1984) Studies in the Theory of Ideology – most prominently 
Bourdieu, Habermas and Giddens. Thompson himself, of course, 
also ranks among the exceptions (see especially Thompson 1984, 
1990).
4 Some would say: microsociologists. But for reasons that have to 
do with the very nature of language, to be discussed at length in 
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what follows, I tend to have strong reservations regarding that 
facile micro/macro dichotomy. See Collins (1981) for a discussion 
and Collins and Blot (2003) for a very fine illustration of why 
sociolinguists are not necessarily just microsociologists.
5 I do not suggest here that we are only Durkheimians: we are 
also, equally unwittingly, Weberians, Marxians and Freudians for 
instance. I choose Durkheim as a point of reference because some 
of the fundamental concepts he designed are highly useful in the 
particular exercise I shall undertake here. And as a gesture to 
express that, sociolinguistics, as I see it, has some things to say on 
fundamental sociological and social-theoretical questions.
6 Throughout this attempt, I will follow Garfinkel’s understanding 
of Durkheim (shared by several others) as concerned with 
empirical detail rather than conceptual generalization, and 
with what Durkheim called ‘the objective reality of social 
facts’ as something that can be demonstrated by attending to 
concrete, situated and embodied instances of social (inter-)
action (see e.g. Garfinkel 2002). There are, therefore, aspects of 
Durkheim’s work that I shall not mention and discussions on the 
interpretation of his work that I shall not involve myself in, for I 
do not need all of Durkheim’s work nor any interpretation of it 
in order to make the points I intend to make.
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CHAPTER TWO
Durkheim’s social fact
Emile Durkheim devoted his life to the self-conscious construc-
tion of sociology as a science, and by the end of his life, he had 
achieved that goal. In his view, scientific sociology was a neces-
sity in fin de siècle France. Durkheim shared the widespread 
sense of discomfort of his compatriots, epitomized in the mili-
tary defeat against German forces in 1870, which led both to 
the end of the second Empire and to the revolution of the Paris 
Commune. Society-as-we-knew-it appeared to be falling apart. 
People had become weak, decadent, hedonistic and individu-
alistic, and a generation-long process of industrialization, with 
the growth of a large urban proletariat in mushrooming cities, 
had disrupted France’s national sociocultural cohesion, and 
hence had prejudiced its future as a strong nation. Sociology, 
for Durkheim, was one of the tools needed to reconstruct a 
sense of membership among the French, of a community that 
was characterized by specific and exceptional features – to be 
discovered by scientific sociology and to be spread by a new 
system of ‘moral education’ (the title of his celebrated course 
of lectures; Durkheim [1961] 2002). This sociology was, thus, 
aspirational and prescriptive, a sort of ‘ortho-sociology’; rather 
than just describing what was there, Durkheim set out to con-
vert factual description into normative prescription in view 
of constructing a society that, in his understanding, was not 
yet there.1
Durkheim and the Internet Durkheim’s social fact
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2.1 Norms and concepts
This normative-prescriptive aspect is a point we need to 
remember, for it explains the particular focus of Durkheim’s 
sociology, norms; or to be more precise: the secular moral order 
that should characterize the rational, industrial and science-
based French society of the Third Republic. The existence of 
such an order – implicit and often invisible in everyday life – 
was what Durkheim posited as ‘the social fact’ that made his 
sociology possible; and the vigorous promotion, spread and 
enforcement of this order was the nation-building task of the 
modern French state, via its education system. Eventually, this 
rational civic moral order should replace religion as the belief 
system underlying and organizing society, becoming as ‘sacred’ 
as, previously, religious beliefs. The latter were, according to 
Durkheim, veiled and misconceived understandings of the real, 
essential moral order: 
We must discover those moral forces that men, down to 
the present time, have conceived of only under the form 
of religious allegories. We must disengage them from 
their symbols, present them in their rational nakedness, 
so to speak, and find a way to make the child feel their 
reality without recourse to any mythological intermediary. 
(Durkheim [1961] 2002: 11).
Durkheim’s analogy of the secular moral order with the moral 
order propagated in religion would, in later stages of his 
career, push him towards profound engagements with religion 
as a social fact. For in both the secular and the religious moral 
order he saw the same features at work: both were experienced 
and perceived as beyond the grasp and intention of individuals, 
and as compelling norms of social life. In the case of religion, 
they emanated from a divine force; in the case of social facts, 
society provided them; in both cases, individuals acquired them 
through extended interaction in their communities as well as 
through institutionalized forms of learning and education.
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These features, then, formed the definition of his ‘social fact’. 
Social facts are forms of behaviour and thought that are (1) 
‘exterior to the individual’ and (2) experienced by individuals 
as coercive, constraining and imperative rules, deviation of 
which would come at a price (see e.g. Durkheim [1895] 2010: 
100; discussion in Lukes 1973: 8–15). They are, in short, 
collective rules of which individuals are (at least intuitively) 
aware and to which they must submit. Here is one of the many 
formulations provided by Durkheim:
A rule is not then a simple matter of habitual behavior; it is 
a way of acting that we do not feel free to alter according to 
taste. It is in some measure – and to the same extent that it is 
a rule – beyond personal preference. There is in it something 
that resists us, is beyond us. (Durkheim [1961] 2002: 28)
The religious analogies are plain: the social order is sacred in 
Durkheim’s eyes. The social fact, thus defined, was the object of 
Durkheim’s new sociology; the defining characteristics of social 
facts should distinguish the new discipline from psychology 
(a science devoted to individual behaviour and thought). 
Durkheim soberly observed that people act differently when 
they are alone from when they are in the company of others. 
When alone, instincts, pre-social desires, would regulate 
behaviour (and would be the terrain of psychological analysis); 
social behaviour, by contrast, was regulated by ‘collective 
conscience’ – what we could now call an ‘ideology’ – and by a 
moral discipline pushing individuals to bring the extremes of 
their instincts under control so as to be acceptable in the eyes 
of others.2 In that sense, the development of social behaviour 
marks a transition from ‘absolute existence’ (humans in their 
natural state) to ‘relative existence’ (humans in relation to 
others and to institutions), from an a-moral state to a moral 
state, and from a mode of solitary autarky to one of solidarity 
and labour division (cf. Lukes 1973: 125; many of these 
notions were already elaborated in Durkheim’s dissertation, 
De la Division du Travail Social, [1893] 1967).
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The collective conscience, note, is made up of ‘collective 
representations’ – things we would now call ‘concepts’, relatively 
fixed meaning frames. And while institutions such as state-
sponsored education transmit, across generations, certain collective 
representations typical of the nation-state, such representations 
are acquired alongside more specific ones characterizing and 
organizing life in particular social groups (caste, class, family, 
profession, etc.). The norms that organize social life are, in other 
words, layered and scaled. Socialization proceeded both at the 
level of becoming a citizen of a (homogeneous) country and at 
the level of becoming a member of (more diverse) specific social 
sub-groups. The function of both is the same: norms always 
presuppose ‘a certain disposition in the individual for a regular 
existence – a preference for regularity’ (Durkheim [1961] 2002: 
34). Social rules are, simply put, ‘limits to our natural inclinations’ 
(ibid.: 96). 
Now, although Durkheim would underscore the fact that 
‘man always lives in the midst of many groups’, his views 
on which specific groups we should think about differ from 
publication to publication, and even when he mentions 
groups he does not necessarily devote much analysis to 
them. Moral Education specifies just three such groups: the 
family, the nation (or political group) and humanity ([1961] 
2002: 73–4), for instance, and only the nation is elaborately 
discussed – not surprising in a book that aspired to reorganize 
national education in France. Elsewhere, he would profoundly 
examine professional groups and religious groups as well. In 
all, Durkheim had a strong preference for what we could call 
‘thick’ groups, groups in which people shared a lot of norms, 
values and collective representations, and as we shall see later, 
his influence has been pervasive in that respect. 
2.2 Integration and anomie
Let us recall Durkheim’s motives for the development of a 
sociology. He was gravely concerned about the perceived 
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loss of sociocultural cohesion in the France of his day. He 
believed he was witnessing the disintegration of an old social 
order, while a new one was not yet in place. Consequently, 
his sociology consistently addressed issues of sociocultural 
cohesion or integration: how did this rapidly changing 
society maintain a reasonable degree of cohesion? In De la 
Division du Travail Social, he pointed towards one answer: 
new forms of solidarity grounded in the emergence of new, 
smaller, professional groups were complementing older forms 
of solidarity grounded in ‘deep’ sociocultural ties. And they 
did so by developing alternative moral orders and collective 
representations – the defining features of the ‘social’ as we 
have seen earlier, and in that sense also the defining features of 
identifiable social groups. Members were integrated into such 
groups by subscribing to and adopting these defining features, 
by ‘enregistering’ (we would now say) the moral codes that 
shaped such groups and held them together. In other words, 
integration is a factor of successful socialization of individuals 
into the moral orders of social groups, and social cohesion is 
an aggregate of such forms of integration.
One of the most interesting and productive concepts 
developed by Durkheim is that of anomie. Anomie describes 
a situation in which individuals reject available normative 
orders or cannot draw on them, either by absence of such 
orders or because access to them is restricted. Anomie 
stands for ‘normlessness’. Durkheim discussed the concept 
elaborately in his Suicide ([1897] 1951), and he did so from 
the viewpoint of social cohesion. In a rapidly changing society 
where an old order is on its way out while a new order is under 
construction, he argued, numbers of people find themselves 
in a moral no man’s land where the rules of the social game 
are unknown, unclear or in need of development. Anomie, 
we could say, is the concrete face of social disintegration and 
individual marginalization. And Durkheim saw his own rapidly 
transforming society as prone to anomie, with individuals at 
risk of being poorly or incompletely socialized and at a loss 
finding out what it takes to do well. This moral no man’s 
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land explained the high statistical incidence of suicide, and 
Durkheim provided a primarily social explanation for suicide. 
With some qualifications, Durkheim saw anomie as 
something negative, a lack of a clear and widely shared moral 
social order; individuals caught in anomie are marginalized, 
deviants, outsiders. At the same time, he saw anomie as an 
inevitable feature of sociohistorical change and, in that sense, 
as a constant feature of societies at any point in time. A fully 
integrated society was an aspiration rather than a reality, and 
at any moment in their historical development, societies would 
be characterized by old and new normative systems coexisting 
in sometimes uncomfortable ways. Durkheim did not see the 
creative and productive potential of anomie – the ways in which 
anomie spawns alternative ways of social organization. His view 
of anomie can also be made more useful when it is understood 
not as a top-down phenomenon – from the ‘centre’ of society 
towards its margins – but as a general relational phenomenon 
operating at all levels of social life in the form of (negative) 
normative judgements of one about another. The margins of 
society, seen from this more broadly scoped view, are spaces 
where alternative social orders are quite rigorously observed 
and policed – as Howard Becker (1963) famously demonstrated. 
2.3 Durkheim’s impact and the 
challenge of Rational Choice
I have deliberately been selective here, focusing on elements 
from Durkheim’s work that offer immediate possibilities for 
critical re-evaluation in view of sociolinguistic evidence. Let 
me summarize and reformulate these elements in a series of 
related propositions.
1 There is a set of human forms of behaviour that are 
collective, in the sense that they cannot be reduced 
to individual agency or intention. They are acquired 
socially, through socialization and education processes, 
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in a variety of groups. They have a sui generis reality 
which cannot be explained by explaining individuals’ 
enactments. 
2 These forms of behaviour must be seen as governed 
by sets of sanctioned norms, or ideologies, and the 
character of these norms is moral. Social behaviour 
is moral-normative.
3 These sets of norms characterize social groups, notably 
‘thick’ groups such as those of the nation, class, 
caste, family, profession, religion. We always live in a 
plurality of such groups.
4 These sets of norms are the key to social cohesion 
and integration: people who submit to them will be 
perceived as ‘normal’ members of their social groups, 
while people deviating from them will be confronted by 
anomie and risk becoming outcasts.
In a variety of formulations, these four propositions can be 
found throughout twentieth-century sociology (and beyond). 
Durkheim’s sociology was, like that of for example Dewey and 
Bourdieu but unlike that of for example Weber (Gerth and Mills 
1970: 58) first and foremost a sociology of communities and 
of social cohesion, and it opened several areas of exploration 
that became foundational for twentieth-century social sciences. 
These areas included the study of ethnoclassification and 
ethnoscience (through his work with Marcel Mauss), collective 
memory (through his student Maurice Halbwachs), labour 
organization and labour institutions (influencing, to name just 
a few, Everett C. Hughes, Herbert Blumer and John Kenneth 
Galbraith), socialization (influencing e.g. Jean Piaget), religion, 
cultural symbols and ritual (influencing e.g. Victor Turner and 
Erving Goffman) and several others.
It was Talcott Parsons who turned the priorities of Durkheim’s 
programme into the systematic theory to which Glyn Williams 
took exception, in the effort significantly simplifying some of 
the most interesting but often unstable aspects of Durkheim’s 
work – notably the relationship between ‘society’ and ‘social 
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groups’ and the place of individual agency in society.3 Parson’s 
sociology, as we know, focused on integration at the level of 
‘society’ (e.g. Parsons 2007). Societies would remain integrated 
because of the widespread acceptance of specific and relatively 
enduring sets of values, while norms characterized smaller 
social groups. Norms could differ from the dominant values, 
of course; they could even run counter to these values, but they 
were distinctly ‘lighter’ than values.4 Thus, in a text written in 
1964 on US youth culture (at that time perceived as rebellious 
and increasingly deviant), Parsons confidently concluded that
American society in a sense appears to be running its course. 
We find no cogent evidence of a major change in the essential 
patterns of its governing values. (Parsons 1964: 181)
In other words, the long-haired, pot-smoking and anti-Vietnam 
young rebels of the early 1960s were still good and decent 
Americans, and their shocking behaviour did not shake the 
foundations of the American mode of integration. Four years 
later, such an argument would prove to be hard to sustain, and 
not just in the United States (Elbaum 2002).5
As I said above, Durkheim was very much a sociologist of 
communities, of the collective dimension of social life. The 
most radical challenge to this came from what is now known as 
Rational Choice (Theory) (Green and Shapiro 1994; Adamae 
2003). Rational Choice is an outgrowth of Methodological 
Individualism, something Max Weber introduced as a doctrine 
in the social sciences (and was taken further by e.g. Hayek 
and Popper). Simply put, Methodological Individualism is 
the theory complex in which every human activity is in fine 
reduced to individual interests, intentions, motives, concerns 
and decisions, because (it is argued) individual levels of 
subjectivity in action (even if eminently social) are the only 
ones available to the analyst (Heath 2015). 
Rational Choice is a radicalization of the ‘individualism’ 
in Methodological Individualism. Human action, in Rational 
Choice, is driven by one motive, the maximization of individual 
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‘profit’ (material as well as symbolic), and it proceeds by means 
of calculated, intentional and rational decisions by individuals 
(‘choice’). Since Durkheim’s moral order crucially depended 
on the suppression (or ‘moderation’) of individual interests 
and preferences – egoism is typically seen as immoral – the 
theoretical dichotomy could not be sharper.6
Rational choice, in that sense, is a fundamental denial of 
Durkheim’s ‘social fact’. Even more: it is a lock-stock-and-barrel 
denial of the entire Durkheimian sociological imagination, for 
‘there is no such thing as society’ (to quote Margaret Thatcher’s 
slogan). In Kenneth Arrow’s (1951) famous view, any form of 
collective (rational) choice is just impossible. Arrow, ‘proved’ 
this in his so-called ‘Impossibility Theorem’, quite incredibly by 
means of intricate mathematical argument – and mathematics 
reshaped (and replaced) field-observation-based sociology as 
the privileged source of knowledge on humans and their social 
practices (Adamae 2003: 102–16; cf. Blommaert 2016a). To the 
disbelief of empirical sociologists such as Everett C. Hughes, if 
certain social practices were ruled mathematically impossible, 
it was assumed that their occurrence in the real world was 
exceptional or accidental (cf. Hughes [1971] 2009: xix, 348–54). 
Rational Choice never made a real inroad into sociolin-
guistics; but it largely dominates several social-scientific and 
humanities disciplines, most notably economics (cf. Thaler 
2015).7 Revisiting and revising Durkheim’s social fact from the 
perspective of contemporary sociolinguistics – the exercise I 
shall embark on in the next chapter – therefore implies a rejec-
tion of Rational Choice. A good reason for this is that in the 
more radical varieties of Rational Choice, people never seem 
to communicate, or they communicate only in dyadic logical 
argument when they are allowed to.
Notes
1 Observe that Durkheim, although generally seen as a 
conservative thinker, was not a reactionary. The society he 
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wished to help construct was a new one, not a (mythical) older 
society that needed to be preserved or recovered. Durkheim saw 
the present as unstable and unreliable, an old world that had 
vanished while a new one had not yet taken solid form and was 
moving in negative and destructive directions. His rejection – a 
moral rejection – of the present is quite radical, and contrasts 
remarkably with that of his contemporary Simmel, who viewed 
similar tendencies with a neutral, nonjudgemental gaze, as a 
challenge rather than as a problem.
2 This insistence on temperance and moderation, often presented as 
evidence of his politically conservative and bourgeois views, can 
also be seen as another feature of his analogy between secular 
and (Christian and Jewish) religious moral systems. Foucault 
(2015: 240) concludes his course on The Punitive Society with 
this caustic remark: ‘[Power] is hidden as power and passes for 
society. Society, Durkheim said, is the system of the disciplines, 
but what he did not say is that this system must be analyzed 
within strategies specific to a system of power.’ Foucault saw 
the normative-disciplinary complex emerging in the nineteenth 
century as a core feature of the developing capitalist mode of 
production, and Durkheim’s work on the division of labour as 
a codification of this process, in which he ‘normalized’ a system 
of power specific to and instrumental for this new mode of 
production.
3 See Parsons (1937). Parsons was not alone in seeking completion 
of the Durkheimian project. To name one already mentioned, 
it is hard not to see Foucault’s sustained effort to describe and 
delineate the emergence of the modern ‘normal’ individual 
through forms of discipline as an idiosyncratic engagement 
with some of Durkheim’s unfinished business. See, for example, 
Foucault (2003, 2015). Likewise, one can profitably read, 
for example, Bourdieu’s Distinction (1984) as an elaborate 
engagement with Durkheim’s notions of social cohesion and 
anomie.
4 Much of the pioneering literature on ‘late’ or ‘Post’-Modernity 
implicitly takes this Durkheimian-Parsonian integrated society 
as its benchmark. Thus, for example, Zygmunt Bauman’s 
‘liquid modernity’ evidently takes a ‘solid modernity’ as its 
point of departure (Bauman 2007). Whether such a solid 
modernity was ever a reality rather than a projection of a 
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specific sociological imagination remains an untestable research 
question, although works such as E. P. Thompson’s The Making 
of the English Working Class (1968) strongly suggest that the 
degree of integration of our societies in an earlier stage of their 
development may have been grossly overrated.
5 Needless to say, Parsons’ view of US society as integrated was 
fundamentally challenged, and some will say shattered, by 
Gunnar Myrdal’s monumental American Dilemma (1944).
6 Judging from Durkheim’s ([1897] 1951) discussion of ‘egoistic 
suicide’, egoism is, in effect, a killer rather than a cornerstone of 
social conduct.
7 The few attempts to use Rational Choice in sociolinguistic 
work were rather epic failures in social analysis. Carol Myers-
Scotton’s Social Motivations for Codeswitching (1993) used an 
awkward conception of Rights-and-Obligations sets attached to 
‘codes’, from which speakers would rationally choose the most 
advantageous one; the actual social settings in which code-
switching occurs were dismissed as accidental, not fundamental 
(see Meeuwis and Blommaert 1994 for an elaborate critique); in 
David Laitin’s Language Repertoires and State Construction in 
Africa (1992), an equally awkward variety of Game Theory is 
used to arrive at an ideal, rational ‘3 + 1 language outcome’ for 
language policy in Africa. The argument is entirely detached from 
anything that ties languages to real social environments.
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CHAPTER THREE
Sociolinguistics and 
the social fact: Avec 
Durkheim
So let us first establish this: people do communicate; they 
communicate all the time, in highly diverse and complex 
modes, often with more than one interlocutor, and not 
always logically, economically or rationally; it is through 
interaction that they are recognized as ‘social’, as a ‘subject’, 
and as producers of ideas. Affirming this is, of course, of an 
extraordinary triviality. But this trivium has been denied and 
neglected in tons of sociological and other social-scientific 
work, turning it not in a truism but into a hard-fought 
methodological principle. Establishing that principle means 
affirming the very possibility of a sociolinguistics. And I think 
we have pretty decent empirical back-up for this principle and, 
thence, for the possibility of sociolinguistics. So let us show 
some of that evidence in what follows.
I repeat what I mentioned earlier: while almost every major 
sociologist would emphasize (or at least mention) interaction 
as a given, detailed attention to interaction has never really 
been part of the sociological mainstream. Interaction was paid 
lip service to, and communication is often seen as a set of 
rudimentary transmission practices not worthy of study in its 
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own right – something so elementary that it belongs to the décor 
in which real social action is played out and does not demand 
further examination.1 Blumer, defining the methodological 
position of symbolic interactionism as it was being kept in the 
margins of the sociology of his time, lamented (1969: 7):
A society consists of individuals interacting with one another. 
The activities of the members occur predominantly in 
response to one another or in relation to one another. Even 
though this is recognized almost universally in definitions of 
human society, social interaction is usually taken for granted 
and treated as having little, if any, significance in its own right.
Durkheim was no exception. And this, remarkably, led to 
generations of sociologists overlooking what is potentially the 
most self-evident social fact. Let me sketch some aspects of it, 
and start with the most general one.
3.1 Language as a normative collective 
system: Ordered indexicality
People can only communicate with others when they share 
and deploy different forms of ‘grammar’ – conventionalized 
normative patterns ordering the potential mess of symbols 
we call language, ensuring that we ‘make sense’ to each other. 
This simple observation should be sufficient to establish it as a 
Durkheimian social fact pur sang.2 But let me elaborate this – 
begging the reader for tolerance for the highly sketchy summary 
of complex histories of linguistic thought in what follows.
The different forms of grammar can – roughly – be divided 
into grammars of form and grammars of usage, and usually 
the term ‘grammar’ is reserved for the former: the fact that the 
formal, morphosyntactic organization of linguistic expressions 
is governed by language-specific (i.e. non-individual) rules, 
compliance with which displays some degree of flexibility 
but is overall quite strict and relatively stable and enduring. 
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Description of these formal rules became ‘linguistics’, and 
their relatively stable and enduring character became the 
key element in identifying separate ‘languages’ (cf. Silverstein 
1977; Irvine 2001; Bauman and Briggs 2003; Blommaert 
2013; see Agha 2007a: 222 for a concise discussion). As for 
grammars of usage, they gradually became a separate domain 
of study (called ‘Pragmatics’) through the work of language 
philosophers such as Austin (1962), Grice (1975) and Searle 
(1969) (cf. Verschueren 1999). Here, too, relatively stable and 
enduring rules were detected, although the overlap between 
such rules and separate ‘languages’ was less outspoken. Rules 
of politeness, for instance, appeared to be connected more to 
social and cultural groups than to the actual ‘languages’ they 
use, and were even seen as potentially universal (Brown and 
Levinson 1987; for a critical appraisal see Eelen 2001). A 
generation of anthropologists had, in the meantime, provided 
mountains of literature on the sociocultural embedding of 
language in specific (often ‘ethnic’ or ‘tribal’) communities 
(see Hymes1964 for a survey), while symbolic-interactionist 
sociologists in the United States had started exploring the 
social-scientific significance of everyday patterns of social 
interaction in their own social environments (e.g. Goffman 
1959; Garfinkel 1967; Blumer 1969).
The eminently social fact of grammar, remarkably, became 
individualized as soon as universals became the ambition of 
linguistic theory, in the wake of Noam Chomsky’s epochal 
reformulation of linguistic as a science of ‘competence’ – the 
mentally structured capacity to generate grammatically well-
formed sentences (e.g. Chomsky 1965). Chomsky announced 
that the focus on competence meant that linguists should be 
concerned with an ‘ideal’ speaker/hearer operating outside of 
any form of real communicative situation; and this ideal speaker 
became an individual speaker whose ‘language’ existed, in 
universal ways and (contrary to De Saussure’s view) perfectly, 
in his or her individual brain (see Katz 1972 for an excellent 
example and Cicourel 1973, Chapters 3 and 4, for a critique). 
Methodological Individualism, thus, entered the science of 
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language through the detour of psychologism, and social and 
cultural norms were replaced by mental operations unaffected 
by (socially and culturally contextualized) ‘performance’. 
Language had become an a-social fact.
Modern sociolinguistics was a reaction to that; and from its 
very beginnings, work in sociolinguistics would struggle to re-
establish language as a social fact. Reaching back to the oeuvres 
of Sapir and Whorf, the abstract language designated as the 
object of linguistics was countered by situated, contextualized 
‘speech’ and such speech had to be understood in terms of 
a dialectics of language and social life, lodged in a ‘speech 
community’ (Hymes 1966, 1972, 1980; Gumperz 1968, 
1982). And apart from a (possibly) mentally hardwired and 
universal grammatical competence – the linguistic system – one 
should also consider the group-specific and culturally relative 
communicative competence – the sociolinguistic system 
(Hymes 1992). Communicative competence, note, referred 
to knowledge of the sociocultural norms of language and 
the capacity to deploy them adequately in a variety of social 
circumstances. The norms of language, thus, were defined as 
sociocultural constructs in a theoretical frame emphasizing 
action; and Michael Silverstein (again drawing on Whorf) put 
a gloss on them: ‘language ideologies’ (Silverstein 1979).
I shall be forgiven for this breathless rush through half a 
century of intellectual development, for I have arrived now 
where I wanted to arrive. The concept of language ideologies, 
which rose to prominence and became a unifying focus in the 
1990s (Kroskrity, Schieffelin and Woolard 1992; see Blommaert 
2006a for a review), offered a comprehensive framework for 
revisiting language as a social fact, in nearly all aspects. The 
central idea proved extraordinarily productive: language is 
used on the basis of socioculturally grounded conventions 
dialogically organizing its production and understanding; the 
empirical basis for such ideologies are concrete ‘indexicals’, that 
is features of communicative action pointing in nonrandom 
ways to salient, context-specific sociocultural meaning 
reservoirs, and ultimately to social structure (see Agha 2007b; 
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also De Fina, Schiffrin and Bamberg 2006; Cicourel 1973 and 
Gumperz 1982 can be seen as precursors). Indexicals, thus, 
invoke conventionalized and therefore presupposed histories of 
meaningful usage (or ‘models’, Gal 2016: 119) and precipitate 
them into new moments of deployment with active, responsive 
interlocutors. In Silverstein’s words:
Now any indexical process, wherein signs point to a 
presupposed context in which they occur (i.e. have occurred) 
or to an entailed potential context in which they occur 
(i.e. will have occurred), depends on some metapragmatic 
function to achieve a measure of determinacy. It turns 
out that the crucial position of ideologies of semiosis is in 
constituting such a mediating metapragmatics, giving parties 
an idea of determinate contextualization for indexicals, 
presupposable as shared according to interested positions 
or perspectives to follow upon some social fact like group 
membership, condition in society, achieved commonality of 
interests, etc. Ideology construes indexicality. In so doing 
ideology inevitably biases its metapragmatic ‘take’ so as to 
create another potential order of effective indexicality that 
bears what we can appreciate sometimes as a truly ironic 
relation to the first (1992: 315).
This principle could be applied to the formal grammar 
of language, which appears subject to strong language-
ideological effects (e.g. Silverstein 1979; Errington 1988; 
Irvine and Gal 2000); to the learning of language norms in 
socialization processes (e.g. Schieffelin and Ochs 1986); to 
the use of specific ‘registers’ governing concrete sociocultural 
domains of speech and subject to processes of incorporation 
called ‘enregisterment’ (e.g. Agha 2005, 2007b); to patterns of 
everyday narratives (De Fina, Schiffrin and Bamberg 2006); 
to lay and institutionalized concepts of language, including 
sociolinguistic hierarchies and attributed speaker identities 
(e.g. Silverstein 1996, 1998; Agha 2003) and the politics of 
language at nation-state level and in more specific institutional 
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contexts (e.g. Jaffe 1999; Blommaert 1999; Philips 2000; 
Haviland 2003); to intertextual processes of meaning-making, 
resemiotization and entextualization (e.g. Silverstein and 
Urban 1996); to complex contemporary forms of meaning- and 
identity-making involving codeswitching (e.g. Rampton 1995, 
2006). En route, a large number of crucial concepts in the study 
of language were redefined: language itself, speech community, 
genre, style (Gal 2016) and so forth: the range of themes, 
concepts and domains that were profoundly reshaped by the 
conceptual development of language ideologies is extensive.
The truly fundamental theoretical and methodological 
impact of language ideologies, in view of the exercise I 
undertake here, is that it has given us an extraordinarily precise 
view of norms (and their cognates ‘values’ and ‘collective 
representations’). Norms, we now see, are language-ideological 
phenomena produced and enacted in communicative action. 
They are, more precisely, ordered indexicalities: sets of 
indexicals organized in relation to each other, with some of 
them being ‘emblematic’ of the meaning effects they generate – 
a sort of register ‘shibboleth’ effect, as when someone starts a 
sentence with ‘oh dear’ versus ‘fuck’ (cf. Silverstein 2003; Agha 
2005, 2007b; Blommaert 2005), or shifts into a mock accent 
so as to project an evaluated identity on someone else (e.g. 
Hill 2001; Rampton 2006). The fundamentally normative, 
dialogical and interpreted character of social relations, thus, 
becomes clear: whenever we interact with others, we produce 
not just the kinds of denotational meanings one finds in a 
dictionary, but we produce evaluative meanings, in which the 
words, actions and identities of all the participants are weighed 
and given (sociocultural) value. And in so doing we produce, 
moment by moment, ‘culture’ and ‘society’, as well as ‘identity’ 
and ‘meaning’. None of these concepts can be detached 
from interaction – ‘language and culture’, for instance, have 
merged into the interactional production of indexical order 
(Silverstein 2004).
Echoes of Bakhtin and Goffman are evident here: 
language ideologies can in many ways be seen as an extreme 
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methodological refinement of the general ideas articulated by 
Bakhtin (1981, 1986) and Goffman (1971, 1974). Bakhtin’s 
sociohistorical theory of literary form has now been extended 
into the entire field of language in society, and has acquired 
far more analytical purchase and precision; while the micro-
orders of social conduct described by Goffman can now also 
be reformulated in a more systematic and generalizable way. 
I shall come back to the continued relevance of both authors 
further on; in the case of Goffman, we shall see that, in a wider 
sense, the programme of symbolic interactionism (and to some 
extent, of ethnomethodology) is coming back with a vengeance 
(cf. Blumer 1969; Cicourel 1973; Garfinkel 2002). In addition, 
and combining Bakhtin with Goffman, ordered indexicalities 
presuppose, and necessitate, a dialogical and intersubjective 
conception of meaning-making that stretches over the entire 
range of behaviours deployed in what we call ‘interaction’ or 
‘communication’. Whenever we communicate, we keep an 
eye on the other and adjust our communicative behaviour 
to an anticipated uptake from our interlocutors. In contrast 
to what Rational Choice suggest, we are quite altruistic and 
cooperative in communication, and we are happy and eager 
to accommodate the other in our own language use – as 
demonstrated whenever we revert to a kind of pidgin English 
when an obviously confused tourist ask us for directions. Our 
communicative behaviour is regulated by the fact that it is 
organized together with others.3
Three final remarks are in order. 
1 Orders of indexicality are obviously collective, social 
phenomena. I have qualified them as ‘nonrandom’ on 
a couple of occasions already, and this is vital because 
any form of understanding requires recognizability 
in terms of a specific set of ordered indexicals. An 
interaction opened with ‘excuse me, sir’ versus one 
opened with ‘hey, you!’ is likely to be a different 
interaction (probably a difference glossed as ‘polite’ 
versus ‘impolite’), and recognition of this difference can 
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only occur when the participants share the language-
ideological valuations of these indexicals. And they 
do. A study by Silverstein (2015) on public (online) 
discussions of New York accent showed remarkable 
similarities in several categories of valuations given 
by participants, something that corroborates Penelope 
Eckert’s (2008, 2012) notion of ‘indexical fields’. 
Linguistic variation, it now appears, is subject to 
powerful collective language-ideological forces 
(‘We have come to see variation as a more robust 
and dynamic indexical system’ – Eckert 2015: 43; 
also Rampton 2006, 2016a). Section 3.2 will return 
to this.
2 People display an outspoken tendency to create norms 
whenever they are absent or unclearly scripted, and 
new communication technologies provide us with 
plenty of examples of that. The extremely rapid 
development of new social media platforms and apps, 
one can say, presents their users with a situation of 
anomie each time they engage with such novelties. 
And whereas common wisdom would often qualify 
mobile phone texting codes and Facebook interactions 
as ‘anything goes’ because the carefully indoctrinated 
school standards of language and script appear to be 
violated continuously, a more concentrated analysis 
shows that even such apparently open, highly diverse, 
free and unscripted communicative spaces are very 
rapidly filled with ad hoc (and rapidly solidified) 
norms, defining modes of interaction, genres and 
styles, and subject to sometimes rigorous policing. 
These new norms can and do function as tools for 
evading or subverting imposed, top-down rules when 
existing rules are experienced as oppressive (e.g. Varis 
and Wang 2011; Wang, Juffermans and Du 2012; 
Blommaert 2012; Leppänen and Elo 2016; Du 2016; 
Stæhr 2017). As said before, anomie may be defined 
Durkheim and the Internet.indb   26 12/16/2017   6:06:38 PM
 27SOCIOLINgUISTICS AND THE SOCIAL FACT
as a space without norms; at the same time, it is also 
a space where new norms are invited, demanded and 
manufactured – a creative space in which ‘the social’, 
as grounded in the sharedness of sets of norms, is 
instantly shaped. To rephrase this with reference to 
Rational Choice: we see in this phenomenon of instant, 
grassroots norm-creation how people continuously 
surrender their individual choice and freedom to joint 
patterns of regulation and policing. Because they do 
not want to get stuck talking to just themselves, one 
can imagine.
3 While ordered indexicals organize and generate 
‘meaning’, such meanings are not just ‘rational’, that 
is denotational, but also, and simultaneously, aesthetic 
and dramatic. In fact, when people communicate, they 
perform a bundle of functions: epistemic, affective, 
poetic, performative (Hymes 1980; Haviland 1989; 
Bauman and Briggs 1990). And it is this bundle – not 
just its epistemic aspect – that turns communication 
into something that satisfies higher-order social and 
cultural demands (Hymes 1966, 1996; Silverstein 
1985, 1997, 2004; Blommaert 2006b, 2015c). We 
convince others not just by the pureness and truth-
conditional excellence of our argument, but even 
more by the stylistic-narrative performance in which 
it is cast and by the evaluative key in which we frame 
it; and we pay meticulous attention to all of this 
while we build our argument. In the view of Charles 
Goodwin (2007), there is something inherently moral 
in epistemic practices, since the latter demand a tightly 
organized set of moves within a chosen participant 
framework, rupture of which is seen as a moral as 
well as an epistemic issue (cf. also Goodwin 1994). 
This simple observation blows out of the water any 
theory in which human communication is reduced 
to the rational exchange of pure (and perfectly 
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retrievable) meanings. To put it somewhat crudely 
and in folksy terms: human rationality is very much 
tied up with, in practice even indistinguishable from, 
human irrationality – emotion, morality and aesthetics. 
We are very subjective when we believe we are 
objective and can get quite emotional when we discuss 
‘the facts’.4
I have used a lot of space discussing this first element – 
language as a normative collective system, now understood 
through the conceptual instruments of language ideologies – 
for it underlies several of the points that follow. I can treat 
these points somewhat more concisely now.
3.2 Language variation: Dialects, 
accents and languaging
I have already mentioned above (pace Eckert) that language 
variation is now seen as an indexical system of distinction. 
Language is the great diversifier: even the smallest feature 
can serve as an emblem of fundamental identity difference 
(Rampton 1995; Blommaert 2015b). But let us start where we 
have to start: with the features that index such distinctions, 
language variation itself.
Recall the elements that Durkheim identified as defining the 
social fact: social facts (a) were phenomena that transcended the 
control of the individual and (b) had a compelling, normative 
effect on individuals. Now consider a straightforward case: 
all over the world, people learn a language we call English; 
they do so, in formal education, on the basis of a corpus of 
teaching materials that are amazingly similar (in fact, they can 
be seen as standardized industrial mass products). Yet all over 
the world, and in spite of the near-uniform input, people speak 
English with an accent. These accents are clearly identifiable: 
few would not be able to tell the difference between, say, an 
‘American’ accent and a ‘French’ one, and many would be 
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able to distinguish an ‘Indian’ accent from a ‘Nigerian’ one. 
In fact, such distinctions have led to the development of a 
branch of applied linguistics called ‘World Englishes’ (e.g. 
Bhatt 2001; also Pennycook 2007; Seargeant 2009; Mufwene 
2010), where different regional realizations of English are 
no longer seen as deviations from ‘standard’ English but as 
bona fide language varieties in their own right, often with 
names such as ‘Hinglish’ (Hindi-English: Kothari and Snell 
2011) or more generically ‘country name + English’, as in 
‘Brunei English’. The range of ‘typical’ features, for instance 
in Brunei English, is extensive and stretches from phonetics 
and morphosyntax into discursive and lexical differences. 
The explanations for such differences are usually sought 
in influences from language contact with ‘native’ language 
substrates, the specific history of English in the region, the 
local or regional language policies and the education system 
(Deterding and Sharbawi 2013). In the case of Hinglish, apart 
from these factors, the influence and prestige of a powerful 
Hindi-language popular culture is also noted (Kothari 2011). 
(Observe that we are addressing a globalization phenomenon 
here, and I shall return to this.)
The fact, however, remains the same. People growing up 
and living in specific regions of the world acquire features of 
speech that are distinctly, and identifiably, regional – ‘from 
there’. These features – accents – are extraordinarily powerful 
identity shibboleths; in fact the word ‘shibboleth’ itself refers to 
a biblical story in which accent in speech was used to distinguish 
allies from enemies (and to kill the latter, appropriately 
identified). And getting rid of an acquired accent is quite a 
slow, difficult and sometimes painful job, for which, in the 
meantime, a branch of specialized therapists and providers has 
emerged (cf. Blommaert 2008a; Silverstein 2015). Variation in 
speech, we can see, is not something one typically chooses – it 
is acquired through socialization processes, that is through a 
shared history in a community in which the fine distinctions of 
speech are learned and embodied. Those are phenomena that 
transcend the individual, no one really owns them.
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As for their compelling, normative effects, we must keep 
earlier remarks in mind and turn to a venerable branch of 
sociolinguistics: social dialectology in the tradition of Peter 
Trudgill.5 Drawing on Britain and Cheshire (2003a), several 
points are worth noting.
1 Collective identity appears to be the main driver 
guiding the dynamics of dialect. More specifically, 
dialect, however defined, is a shibboleth for regional 
identity, that is a recognizable identity shared by people 
inhabiting a particular region, currently or in the 
past; dialect indexes the local and the regional (also 
Johnstone 2010; Silverstein 2015).
2 Identity issues also govern innovation and change. The 
latter depend strongly on degrees of social integration. 
The better people are integrated in the community, 
the more they will contribute to innovation in dialect, 
due to the tendency to index specific sub-groups 
within that community. Social isolation – as with for 
example spatially isolated ‘outliers’ in poorly populated 
areas – slows down the patterns of change in dialects 
(Britain 2003).
3 ‘Dialect levelling’ – a well-known feature in 
dialectology, in which dialects appear to develop in 
a more convergent way, depends on social factors as 
well: speech accommodation between speakers of 
different dialectal backgrounds (Kerswill 2003).
4 The tendency to index specific subgroups through 
dialect innovation highlights (a) the heterogeneity of 
dialect ‘speech communities’ and (b) the importance 
of ‘loose social networks’ (Watts 2003; also Silverstein 
2016) in language change.
5 Throughout all of the above, ‘social categories are … 
seen as ideologically-driven processes’ (Britain and 
Cheshire 2003b: 4): the dynamics of dialect change 
is governed by language-ideological attributions – 
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the normative and identity-projecting phenomena 
discussed in the previous section (also Rampton 2009; 
Gal 2016).
The latter can be observed in yet another dimension of lan-
guage change: languaging, the extraordinarily creative mixing 
and blending of linguistic and expressive resources typical of 
sociolinguistically highly complex environments (Jørgensen 
2008; Creese and Blackledge 2010; Jørgensen et al. 2016; Juf-
fermans 2015; Madsen, Karrebæk and Møller 2015; Blom-
maert and Rampton 2016). While languaging, at first sight, 
appears like unregulated bricolage or mash-up business or a 
kind of communicative anomie (and is often so perceived by 
those in charge of guarding the gates of language correctness), 
a closer look reveals a tremendous level of structuring, all of 
it governed language-ideologically by delicate shifts in (iden-
tity) ‘footing’, alignment between speakers and changes in the 
participant framework. Needless to say that current social 
media usage displays a phenomenal amount of such forms of 
languaging in new forms of graphic practice (e.g. Tagliamonte 
2015; Du 2016).
The bricolage can, in effect, reveal differences between locally 
constructed and discernible varieties (Kailoglou 2015; Madsen 
2017; also Rampton 2011), and can be a powerful instrument 
for ‘styling’ specific identities –  ironically, ritually, playfully, or 
quite seriously (Rampton 1995, 2006; Coupland2007, 2015; 
Cutler 2009). The more serious forms of styling may revolve 
around highly ritualized minimal displays of a ‘heritage 
language’, with tremendous identity-establishing effects (e.g. 
Moore 2017). And ‘quite seriously’ can also mean ‘making 
money’, of course: the  commodification of language variation 
in new economic sectors – think of tourism, marketing and 
call centres as examples – has turned sociolinguistics into the 
profitable exchange of more than just symbolic capital (Heller 
2010; Jaworski and Thurlow 2010; Blommaert 2010; Kelly- 
Holmes 2010;  Woydack 2017).
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3.3 Inequality, voice, repertoire
In discussing languaging, I have already pointed to the linguistic 
and expressive resources that people use in such complex 
forms of discursive work. Such resources are, of course, not 
evenly distributed in any society, and the reasons for this are 
social.6 Hymes (1996: 26–7) stated this problem clearly: while 
language obviously offers a pool of opportunities to people, 
it simultaneously acts as a constraint; it is a human social 
treasure trove as well as a human social problem, since no 
single person knows all of a language, and meeting the limits 
of what we can communicate is an acutely frustrating social 
experience for all of us. Throughout life, we continuously 
acquire new sets of resources while we shed older, obsolete 
ones; and in its most general sense, we are always constrained 
by what is communicable and what is not – we often have 
no words for what needs to be expressed.7 But let me focus 
on two specific elements by way of illustration: (1) access to 
specific register and genre resources and (2) access to specific 
contexts for communication.
1 In general, and contrary to the suggestion of the ideal 
(or ‘native’) speaker/hearer, no real human being has 
access to all the resources that circulate socially, for 
several reasons. There can be institutional barriers 
reserving ‘elite’ resources for a small group of people, 
creating effective hierarchical patterns of access to what 
Bourdieu (1982) called ‘legitimate language’ – and 
access to ‘standard’ English in large parts of the world 
is a case in point (Park and Wee 2012; Blommaert 
2010, 2014). People have easy access to spoken 
vernacular varieties of English widespread in global 
popular culture and open to informal learning – which 
is why words such as ‘fuck’ and ‘shit’ occur almost 
everywhere – while literacy-based standard varieties 
are far more difficult (and expensive) to obtain, 
and specialized registers such as legal-bureaucratic, 
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literary or academic varieties even more so, since they 
demand access to effectively policed formal learning 
channels and ‘members only’ communities of users. 
Thus, illiterate people are likely never to produce 
written discourse, and not because of choice but 
because of social-institutional structural reasons. And 
there are many misunderstandings that are grounded 
not in an individual’s poor choice of words but in an 
asymmetrical degree of communicative competence 
between speakers (Gumperz 1982 is a classic; also 
Roberts 2016). Processes of access restriction are not 
necessarily ‘institutional’ though: similar forms of 
gatekeeping occur almost everywhere. Howard Becker’s 
(1963) Outsiders described how ‘marginal’ social 
groups such as marihuana-smoking jazz musicians 
also deploy tactics of selection and exclusion through 
specific modes of talk distinguishing ‘those in the 
know’ from newcomers or ignorant ‘outsiders’. Much 
of the literature on styling and languaging reviewed 
earlier addresses exactly such small peer-group 
identity dynamics in which group-specific, exclusive, 
enregistered phonological, morphosyntactic, lexical and 
genre features are made emblematic of membership 
and eligibility (cf. Silverstein 2006; Blackledge and 
Creese 2016).
2 As to restrictions of access to specific contexts, 
again, nobody has access to all available contexts that 
make up the communicative economies of societies. 
This is again clearest in institutional contexts, 
where, for instance, defendants and witnesses in 
courts have no access to the context of verdict-
making, which is exclusively reserved for the judges. 
More generally, expert contexts are often decisive 
in social life, while they are tightly controlled on a 
‘members only’ basis by the experts themselves (e.g. 
Cicourel 1967; Briggs 1997, 2005; Mehan 1996). 
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We often have no impact on what others do with 
our words in patterns of re-entextualization we call 
‘text trajectories’, in which a subject’s statement 
is recorded by someone, summarized in a report 
by someone else for yet someone else, who takes a 
decision which is then moved down the trajectory 
and fed back to the subject – as in bureaucratic 
procedures or newspaper interviews (e.g. Blommaert 
2001). Obviously, access to such restricted contexts is 
already conditioned by (1) above: one needs specific 
forms of language and literacy proficiency in order 
to enter such social spaces. And in a world in which 
large chunks of communication demand access to 
hi-tech ICT equipment and infrastructures, such 
inequalities display no tendencies to disappear (Wang 
et al. 2014).
Both forms of inequality would operate across the spectre 
of the sociolinguistic system, but of course, some would be 
subject to more outspoken and structural forms of exclusion 
and marginalization than others. Hymes himself focused on 
the predicament of Native American groups, and speakers 
of small, minority or immigrant languages are, evidently, in 
structurally weaker positions than speakers of majority and 
prestigious varieties – recent sociolinguistics has provided an 
avalanche of work on these themes (for an elaborate case study, 
see the essays in Blommaert et al. 2012). Thus, sociolinguistic 
inequalities characterize every social system, and the causes 
for such inequalities are social. Hymes (1996) coined the term 
‘voice’ for the actual capacity of people to make themselves 
understood and noted that problems of voice represent the 
critical dimension of sociolinguistic work: rather than merely 
describing sociolinguistic diversity as a kind of juxtaposition of 
equally valuable varieties, we should engage with the question 
as to why particular varieties are, in actual fact, not equal to 
others – questions of voice as a sociopolitical given, voice as 
the reflection of social structures in the actual communicative 
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abilities of people (cf. Blommaert 2005, 2008b; Van der Aa 
2012; Scott 2013).
The latter move involves and presupposes attention to rep-
ertoires: the actual resources people have acquired and can 
 effectively deploy in communication. The notion of repertoire 
has only recently been made into a topic of profound reflec-
tion, often from an awareness that widespread qualifications 
such as ‘speaker of language X’, or even ‘(non)native speaker 
of language X’ are entirely inadequate as descriptors of the 
tremendous diversity in degrees of proficiency and commu-
nicative ability people display (e.g. Blommaert and Backus 
2013; Rymes 2014; Busch 2015). Repertoires are by defini-
tion uniquely individual and can be described as ‘indexical 
biographies’ reflecting the social experiences of people with 
specific orders of indexicality – exposure, immersion, learning, 
informal acquisition – and the ways in which such experiences 
reflect the social order and inscribe individuals into a wide 
 variety of group memberships. What is in people’s repertoires 
is usually there for a good reason: because they needed it at 
some point in social life. In that sense, repertoires are traces 
of social norms, or if you wish, traces of the compelling and 
often even coercive and consequential evaluative responses of 
others in our lives – traces of power, in short. Taking that to 
the theoretical level: repertoires once more show how becom-
ing and being a unique individual is a fundamentally social 
process – socialized, dialogical, normative, dynamic.
Facts of sociolinguistic distribution, we can see, shape a 
field of power and are reproduced by it, and turn language, 
in its various manifestations, into a heavily policed object 
in which potentially every difference can be turned into a 
consequential form of inequality. The term ‘voice’, as used 
here, points towards this consequentiality: the normative or-
ganization of language – notably the tendency to standard-
ize forms of language and language usage into highly politi-
cally sensitive templates – affects the life chances of people, 
and sociolinguistics has brought a wealth of evidence to this 
point. Specifically through the lens of sociolinguistic analysis, 
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we can observe in great detail the way in which an infinitely 
fractal system of normativity – indexicals and their forms of 
order – turns into a capillary power structure in Foucault’s 
(2015) sense, with on the one end elaborate formal and insti-
tutional systems of ‘language testing’ (e.g. Extra, Spotti and 
Van Avermaet 2011; Spotti 2016),8 and on the other end the 
minute-by-minute evaluative judgements of people’s commu-
nicative actions by their interlocutors in everyday life.
3.4 Language, the social fact
If Durkheim would have attended more closely to language 
and how it operates in and through society, he would have 
had considerably less trouble establishing his fait social. Half 
a century of sociolinguistics has proven, at great length and in 
infinite detail, that language can only be explained as a social 
fact – other explanations are absurd. Particularly absurd, we 
can conclude quite confidently, is Rational Choice. Almost 
everything that has been brought up by sociolinguists flatly 
contradicts the central assumptions of Rational Choice and 
offers loads of hard and conclusive empirical evidence for 
this contradiction. The worldview of Rational Choice, from 
a sociolinguistic viewpoint, is that of a world populated by 
people who only talk to themselves. 
Perhaps the greatest advantage of sociolinguistics, and its 
most important contribution to sociological theory, is the high-
ly detailed and precise view of normativity I discussed in Sec-
tion 3.1. The ‘norms’, ‘values’ and ‘collective representations’ 
that characterize the Durkheimian (and Parsonian) assump-
tions about integration and social coherence are given a feet-
on-the-ground realism as continuously evolving, dialogically 
constructed social actions in which meaning, in the traditional 
linguistic sense, is entirely blended with sociocultural, inter-
subjective evaluations of a moral nature, precipitating what 
we call ‘identity’. Identity is not a product, nor an a priori, but 
the material of interaction itself and, so, the material of social 
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order. Since this material is extremely  diverse, the social or-
der is too, and the robust confidence with which, for  instance, 
 Parsons (2007) spoke about the ‘American core values’ ap-
pears entirely unjustified from the viewpoint of sociolinguistic 
evidence – the price of analytical precision is ontological diver-
sification (Parkin 2016).
Remember that one of the central arguments in favour 
of Methodological Individualism was that in human action, 
only individual subjectivity was observable. On the basis of 
what we have seen so far, this argument, too, has been dealt a 
death blow. One of sociolinguistics’ contributions to a theory 
of social action is intersubjectivity: the fact that people, when 
communicating, require a dialogically established normative 
template shared with others in order to arrive at ‘meaning’; 
the latter is an interpretive effect, constantly negotiated and 
accommodated intersubjectively (and not necessarily by means 
of ‘purely’ rational means). To the extent that social action 
is communicative action, it is joint action (cf. Blumer 1969; 
Cicourel 1973). 
In the next chapter, I shall add to what has been established so 
far. There were things that Durkheim and his successors in the 
Grand Tradition of sociology could not possibly have known. 
They nuance some of the assumptions underlying classical 
sociology and they open exciting alternative trajectories of 
sociological re-imagination. 
Notes
1 The assumption seems to be: since we all do it, there is no need 
to study it. Hence Hymes’s critical views of the communication-
focused work of Bourdieu and Habermas – two exceptions to the 
rule just sketched here (Hymes 1996: 52–6). My own verdict on 
Bourdieu is significantly more merciful (Blommaert 2015a). As 
for Habermas’s Theory of Communicative Action, (Habermas 
1984), I share Hymes’s critique. Hymes points to the abstract 
and normative-idealized treatment of communication patterns 
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in the work of both, detecting a lack of sensitivity to the actual 
ways in which language functions in real social environments. 
Habermas can be said, at most, to specify a set of ideal normative 
preconditions for communication.
2 De Saussure, who attended lectures by Durkheim, already 
pointed to ‘a grammatical system that exists virtually in every 
brain, or more precisely in the brains of a community of 
individuals; because language is never complete in any individual, 
it exists in its perfect state only in the masses’ (1960: 30; 
French original, my translation). Observe here how De Saussure 
adopts Durkheim’s concept of ‘social fact’ and, as we shall see, 
deviates strongly in this from the Methodological Individualism 
characterizing many subsequent developments in linguistics.
3 I cannot enter into detail here, but the well-known Gricean 
Maxims (Grice 1975) assume cooperativity in communication as 
a given – in general, we want to understand and be understood 
whenever we communicate – and there is an entire tradition 
of ‘Accommodation Theory’ in which speech convergence 
between interlocutors is studied (Giles, Coupland and Coupland 
1991). Cooperation is also the central assumption to most of 
Conversation Analysis (e.g. Schegloff, Jefferson and Sacks 1977).
4 Knowledge practices in science are no exception, and there is a 
large methodological literature criticizing the claims to objectivity 
made in various branches of science. Aaron Cicourel’s Method 
and Measurement in Sociology (1964) famously confronted 
mainstream statistical research with the problems of inevitable 
subjectivity in interaction. His critique had a profound effect 
on Bourdieu’s methodology as well, and for Bourdieu, the only 
possible road to objectivity was the recognition of subjectivity 
in knowledge construction (Blommaert 2015a; for a cognate 
argument see Fabian 1983).
5 Note that ‘dialect’ in the traditional sense is a notion that has 
come under fire from language-ideologically inspired linguistic 
anthropology. Gal (2016: 117) observes that varieties defined on 
the basis of situation of use – ‘registers’ – are hard to distinguish 
from those associated with spatial identity – ‘dialects’ and 
‘sociolects’; Silverstein (2016) adds to this a historical reanalysis 
showing how traditional dialect research can, and should, be 
reformulated as concerned with enregisterment. This idea was a 
central assumption in Agha (2007b) as well.
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6 Without too much comment, I can observe that this view 
obviously clashes with the notion of the ‘ideal speaker/hearer’ 
that became the hallmark of Chomskyan linguistics (see section 
3.1 above). What follows can be read as a straightforward 
empirical refutation of this notion.
7 Foucault (1969) coined the term ‘archive’ to identify the limits 
of what can be conventionally thought and understandably 
communicated: if we communicate within the archive, we are 
‘normal’ and others will understand us; if we communicate 
outside the boundaries of the archive, chances are that others 
will qualify us as lunatics. See Blommaert (2005: 99–103) for a 
discussion.
8 Many of these forms of language testing could doubtless be 
categorized as forms of ‘power without knowledge’, to use 
David Graeber’s terms, ‘where coercion and paperwork largely 
substituted for the need for understanding … subjects’ (2015: 65; 
see also Section 4.8). The benchmarks of such testing modes are 
usually fictitious ‘standard’ forms of language, imagined levels of 
competence, and ludicrous projections of degrees of fluency onto 
broader sociopolitical levels of citizenship. This form of science 
fiction, nonetheless, has become increasingly prominent as an 
instrument of power and exclusion in the field of migration, 
almost everywhere.
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CHAPTER FOUR
What Durkheim could 
not have known: Après 
Durkheim
Several of the phenomena discussed in the previous section 
bore the imprint of globalization. An acute awareness of 
globalization as an ongoing reality-shaping and reshaping 
process is what sets our sociological imagination apart from 
that of Durkheim and his followers, who operated within the 
confines of the nineteenth- and twentieth-century nation-state 
and its social and institutional organization. Durkheim was, 
along with many of his disciples, a methodological nationalist 
whose sociology did accept change (indeed, as we have seen, 
coming to terms with social change was what prompted 
Durkheim to his intellectual efforts), but change within a 
sedentary system which was coincident with the nation-state. 
This is remarkable, for globalization was very much a reality in 
Durkheim’s days. Colonization and an increasingly integrated 
world economy – Hobsbawm’s ‘Age of Empire’ – had brought 
the world to places such as Paris and London. But this world 
was seen through the spectre of one’s country, the structures, 
needs and imagination of which depended, precisely and 
paradoxically, on its global reach. 
Durkheim and the Internet
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What Durkheim could not have known
The current phase of globalization is, on the one hand, 
qualitatively different from that of the Age of Empire, and 
this is to a very significant extent an effect of the internet – a 
technology that changed the world in the last decade of the 
twentieth century, allowing a tremendous increase in speed, 
volume and density of global flows and networks (see Castells 
1996; Eriksen 2001). Due to this change, Hobsbawm (2008: 
155) observes how ‘the Empire expands wider still and wider’: 
the global internet infrastructure and the pattern of traffic 
density mirrors, astonishingly, global information networks 
established in the late nineteenth century; persistent global 
inequalities are, in that sense, extended and expanded by 
the internet (see Read 1992; Blommaert 2016b). And such 
processes shape as well as occur in a new environment of 
communication and information, the details of which we are 
beginning to understand (cf. Seargeant and Tagg 2014; Varis 
and van Nuenen 2017). The point in all of this is that those who 
prefer to believe that there is nothing fundamentally new to the 
current stage of globalization are quite dramatically wrong. We 
are indeed witnessing a very, very profound qualitative change 
with momentous effects on the nature and circulation of 
knowledge and sociocultural norms, as well as on the structure 
of communities and social cohesion. More on this below.1
But on the other hand, as said earlier: perhaps even more im-
portantly, the present stage of globalization is accompanied by 
an awareness of it, an awareness that social processes nowadays 
operate at a variety of scales, of which the nation-state is just 
one and the global reach of the World Wide Web another. And 
this awareness is revisionist in nature, as it forces us to revisit 
and redirect a sociological imagination circumscribed and col-
oured by methodological nationalism. Both points – a qualita-
tive difference and a different awareness of globalization – are 
things that did not belong to the worldview within which Dur-
kheim and his successors such as Parsons operated.
In what follows, I shall explore the revisionist effects of this. 
And I shall do this by proposing a series of theories emerging 
from contemporary sociolinguistic work. I shall be using 
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a simple assumption: if interaction is what makes us social, 
theoretical insights into interaction must have wider relevance 
and can be used as a template for theorization at a higher 
level.2 As noted at the very beginning, formulating theories is 
not exactly sociolinguists’ bread and butter – but the editor 
of a recent volume on theoretical debates in sociolinguistics 
explicitly invites it (Coupland 2016). So let me try.
It goes without saying that much of what I shall present 
here cannot, strictly speaking, be called ‘new’ theory. Similar 
ideas have circulated throughout the twentieth century and 
have gained currency in the first decade of the twenty-first – 
echoes from Goffman, Giddens, Simmel and even Husserl will 
be heard, and I took my prompt to engage with these issues 
from Manuel Castells’s (1996, 2010) and Arjun Appadurai’s 
(1996) amazingly accurate (and continuously updated) late- 
twentieth-century predictions. What sociolinguistics contrib-
utes, however, is a set of empirical arguments that make such 
theoretical propositions compelling and inevitable; it also 
offers an empirically solid basis for reformulations of  social 
theory. Note that while the previous chapter was largely ret-
rospective, drawing on achievements from sociolinguistic 
 research of the past decades, this chapter will be more pro-
spective, drawing on current ongoing work, and therefore also 
programmatic in tone.
Since the discourse will change, it may not be a bad idea 
to specify what I understand by the term ‘theory’. Theory is a 
particular kind of statement: a statement that tries to describe 
and define a type of phenomena out there, in such a way that 
research on individual tokens of these phenomena can be 
hypothetically generalized in a systematic way. Theories, then, 
are statements that enable a generalizable heuristics based on 
hypothesized type-token relationships. Such statements are, 
ideally and in the tradition of Anselm Strauss’s ‘Grounded 
Theory’, already saturated with evidence – they are, to some 
extent, already proven: it is ‘theory from data’ (Glaser and 
Strauss 1999: 1; cf. Holton 2008). But even if a theory is 
already backed up by a serious amount of supporting evidence, 
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in each new piece of research it must operate as a question 
to be answered – or, to use a more familiar terminology, as 
a working hypothesis. The grounded theories I shall propose 
are conceptually relatively ‘light’, for they offer conceptual 
outlines of broad types of social phenomena to be ‘filled in’ 
with empirical detail in actual research.
Finally, I must return to what I said about theory in the preface: 
theory is not definitive and is made from and for research. I find 
no better statement to summarize this view than this one:
In my reading of science, theories arise from the study of 
events: They vary in scope and abstractness; they are pro-
visional, incomplete, require verification and qualification; 
they have a life of potential usefulness but having contrib-
uted to the movement of a science they vanish or become 
incorporated in newer theories. (Strauss 1993: 1)
What follows is nothing more than that, and nothing less.
4.1 Preliminary: Vernacular 
globalization
As I said, I took my prompt from Castells and Appadurai, 
and I will use a particular notion developed by the latter as 
a general frame, a ‘folder’, so to speak, for the theories I shall 
propose below.
There has been no shortage of globalization theories over 
the past couple of decades, and some of them are good. But 
sociolinguistics brings something exceptional to the field 
of globalization studies: a perspective in which the ‘big’ 
movements in globalization (often called ‘flows’: Appadurai 
1996) need to be constantly checked by the minutiae of on-the-
ground communicative practices in which such global forces 
are being enacted and turned into locally performed meaning 
(see e.g. Pennycook 2007, 2010) – something for which 
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Appadurai coined the term ‘vernacular globalization’ (1996: 
10). Observe that, for Appadurai, vernacular globalization is 
more than just a descriptive term, it is a gloss for the general 
condition of contemporary modernity:3
The megarhetoric of developmental modernization … in 
many countries is still with us. But it is often punctuated, 
interrogated, and domesticated by the micronarratives of 
film, television, music and other expressive forms, which 
allow modernization to be rewritten more as vernacular 
globalization and less as a concession to large-scale national 
and international policies. (Appadurai 1996: 10)
To be sure, the dialectic of global and local forces in the 
experiential life-world of human beings (in other words, 
of vernacularization) is perhaps the most complicated 
descriptive and methodological issue in the study of 
globalization processes, and the introduction of a new 
generation of electronic media has certainly complicated 
matters. This was noticed early enough. Appadurai (1996: 
194) noted ‘new forms of disjuncture between spatial and 
virtual neighborhoods’ as an effect of the globalization of new 
electronic media, seriously complicating the actual meaning 
of a term such as ‘local practice’; he also saw the emerging of 
‘diasporic public spheres’ revealing new horizons for political 
and social action, previously imagined within the confines of 
the nation-state (1996: 22).4 Manuel Castells (1996), in turn, 
described the massive effect of new information technologies 
on economic and political processes, on the organization of 
labour, on identity work and on social organization. Castells 
predicted the development of a new type of social formation 
which he called ‘network’ and which was not contained 
by the traditional boundaries of social groups. Both (and 
many more) saw a complex new sociocultural, political and 
economic order in the making, and invited others to join them 
in describing and theorizing these changes. Some of those who 
felt addressed by this call were sociolinguists.
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It is my thesis that contemporary sociolinguistics has almost 
comprehensively theorized vernacular globalization as a condi-
tion of everyday life, the outlines of which can be sketched by 
the keywords polycentricity, mobility and complexity, which 
also count as its ontological assumptions.
Polycentricity stands for the fact that in every environment for 
social action, multiple sets of norms will be simultaneously 
present, although they might not be of the same order – they 
are scaled, stratified, and in that sense never ideologically 
neutral even if represented as such (Carr and Lempert 
2016: 3). Polycentricity defines the intrinsic indeterminacy 
of social actions and processes, and their non-unified 
character: social change involves parts of society developing 
faster than others, creating anachronistic gaps.
Mobility is shorthand for the assumption that social life, 
even if ‘local’ in so many senses of the word, is never 
sedentary but always moving from one set of chronotopes 
into another one, across scales and centres of normative 
focus (cf. Blommaert 2015d). Mobility defines the intrinsic 
instability of social action and processes.
Complexity makes us aware of the fact that, even if every 
form of social activity evolves within a system of such 
activities, that system is always unfinished, dynamic and 
nonlinear or stochastic in the sense that outcomes may not 
be predicted from initial conditions (cf. Blommaert 2016c). 
Complexity defines the intrinsic tentativeness and potential 
redefinability of social action and processes.
This is, of course, a mere sketch of a theory framework, which 
in essence represents a cumulative and generalized result of 
a wide variety of different more precise sociolinguistic theo-
rizations. This theory of vernacular globalization, therefore, 
requires several other more specific theories, providing more 
clarity to the keywords. I shall now turn to these more spe-
cific theories.
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4.2 An indexical-polynomic theory 
of social norms
Let us recall the insistence, throughout the Durkheimian 
tradition of sociology, on norms as the key to defining and 
understanding the social fact, and let us now return to the 
discussion in Section 3.1 on ordered indexicality. In that 
earlier discussion, I explained how norms, in contemporary 
sociolinguistics, need to be seen as nonrandomly organized 
patterns of indexical order, and I stressed the collective and 
dialogical character of such sociolinguistic norms as a decisive 
argument against Rational Choice.
This is an ontological statement, and I believe we can 
broaden its scope from interaction and its ordered indexicals 
to social behaviour in general. Seen from that angle, social 
norms are, in actual fact, ordered sets of interactionally ratified 
behavioural details which we can call behavioural scripts. 
Note, once more,
1 that whatever is normative in social life is socially 
co-constructed in the process of interactional meaning-
making, subject to continuous ratification by others, 
and therefore tentative in character, and 
2 that there is nothing abstract to norms (or ‘values’) 
other than the terms we use to describe them. In 
real social life, norms take on a variety of concrete 
behavioural shapes.5
But that is not all there is to be said on this, certainly when we 
consider globalization and its sociolinguistic impact. In order 
to establish that, let us have a look at some research.
In a truly brilliant study, Sabrina Billings (2014) examined 
beauty pageants in Tanzania – an outlier, so to speak, in the 
world of English and of global mediascapes in Appadurai’s 
(1996: 33) terms. Billings focused on how the selection of 
the most appropriate candidate for Miss Tanzania (through 
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a scaled procedure starting locally, then regionally, then 
 nationally) invoked and deployed sociolinguistic hierarchies 
in which ‘good English’ – fluent performance in a variety of 
English judged to be not-too-local – was the pinnacle of eligi-
bility, even when, officially, candidates could produce public 
discourse in both Swahili (the national language) and English. 
Why is ‘good English’ so important? Because it serves as a 
crucial indexical suggesting superiority on at least two levels: 
(1) nationally and due to the particular sociolinguistic history 
of Tanzania, English is the prestige code associated with the 
status of being ‘educated’ (Billings 2014: 38–53); (2) interna-
tionally, because national pageant organizers operate within 
the Miss World format (Billings 2014: 61) and the Tanzanian 
winner will proceed to the global competition – where ‘good 
English’, once again, is a powerful diacritic.
‘Good English’, as a diacritic in the pageant, is of course not 
sufficient. The young women competing for the title of Miss 
Tanzania must also be judged to be physically beautiful, elegant 
and intelligent (Billings 2014: 92–6). We see a behavioural 
script emerge here, in which discursive normativity – speaking 
‘good English’– is an element of the total order of indexicality 
that rules the pageant. But while it is not sufficient, ‘good 
English’ is decisive. In several examples, quite painful to read, 
Billings shows how even top contenders can be mercilessly 
sanctioned by the critical audience when their on-stage 
discursive performance in English is judged to be inadequate. 
Describing audience reactions in one such case, Billings writes:
The pageant-savvy audience sees through her flimsy effort 
to insert a memorized response to a different question into 
the answer slot. In attempting to present herself as a fluent 
speaker of standard English, the contestant has instead, 
through her inability to answer spontaneously, indexed 
herself as a linguistic phony. (Billings 2014: 107)
The candidate’s discursive performance, in other words, 
was judged to be dishonest, and therefore a betrayal of the 
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behavioural script she tried to produce – that of someone who 
is educated and smart (hence using ‘good English’) and worthy 
of proceeding to the Miss World election. Her discursive 
performance exposed her, in short, as a liar, and this was 
grounds for exclusion. Norms, we can see once more, have 
effective power effects.
Note two important points here.
1 We see that the ratification of the failed behavioural 
script is a judgement of the entire person, and 
the judgement is moral in tone and character: the 
candidate is dismissed because her sociolinguistic 
features were judged to be ‘untrue’, not authentic, not 
honest. We see that, in actual practice, the social norms 
of the Durkheimian world are moralized behavioural 
scripts. Note that the moral, pace Durkheim, is entirely 
concrete and empirical here, operating on a range of 
very concrete behavioural features.
2 We also see how such judgements are scaled, with 
at last three different sets of criteria playing into 
each other in a mutually reinforcing way. There 
are the national and international indexical orders 
already mentioned above, and there is the order of 
the situated, actual moment of performance. The 
candidate stumbled over words, tried to start again, 
manifestly repeated an earlier statement and produced 
a distinct local accent in one expression – and all 
of this provoked cruel laughter from the audience. Into 
the perceived violation of local rules of performance, 
the national and international ones were infused by 
means of what Irvine and Gal (2000) called ‘fractal 
recursivity’, jointly and simultaneously resulting in a 
shattering disqualification of the candidate. 
This is where we can become more precise with respect to the 
notion of polycentricity mentioned in Section 4.1. Speech events 
such as the ones described by Billings are governed by various 
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sets of norms operating on various ‘dimensions of social life’ 
(Carr and Lempert 2016) and orienting towards different real 
or imagined centres of authority (Silverstein 1998; Blommaert 
2005: 172). Some of these norms are general – think of the 
norms governing genres such as public speech – while others 
will be specific – the norms of public speech in a beauty contest 
in Tanzania, for instance. We can see how this contributes to 
the theorizing of vernacular globalization sketched earlier.6
Furthermore, I believe we can generalize this insight, cer-
tainly in the age of widespread social media usage. Communi-
cative actions will always be subject to various simultaneously 
operating sets of norms, since they will always demand attend-
ance to the rules of actual interactional conduct, those of the 
topic of the interaction, its purpose or function, the social and 
cultural conventions governing conduct within specific par-
ticipant frameworks, particular spaces or times, specific types 
of encounters, and so forth. A Facebook update, for instance, 
demands attendance to the (highly dynamic) norms of liter-
acy and linguistic codes, the genre and register norms of an 
‘update’ (not too long, preferably multimodal, etc.), the tacit 
norms of one’s community of ‘friends’ regarding certain topics 
and ways to discuss them (think of prevalent political orienta-
tions in one’s Facebook community), the Facebook rules of 
conduct (proscribing certain forms of obscenity, for instance), 
and the rules of the algorithmic system behind Facebook that 
render certain updates more visible than others. And whether 
or not one is aware of these rules doesn’t really matter: every 
update will generate effects related to all these different but 
simultaneously operating sets of norms.
Thus, whenever we interact with others we find ourselves 
in a polynomic social arena. We respond not just to one 
set of norms but to multiple sets of finely defined norms 
governing aspects of the specific interactional events and 
its context. We can call such sets of highly specific norms 
microhegemonies – more on this below. And the presence of 
multiple microhegemonies turns every instance of social action 
into a polynomic social event.
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Sociolinguistic work brings a far more precise and empirically 
verifiable theory of norms and normativity to social thought 
than most other approaches. When we think of norms, we 
see a polynomic complex of moralized behavioural scripts: 
several concrete sets of ordered indexicals microhegemonically 
governing aspects of conduct, played out simultaneously 
towards, and with, interlocutors who continuously valuate 
them morally and feed these valuations back to us. Given 
the centrality of norms in any sociological imagination since 
Durkheim, this theory will have repercussions on others.
4.3 A genre theory of social action
The theory of norms I sketched here is a building block of 
a theory of action: we can now assume that social action is 
normatively organized in the sense just described. But we 
have to take this somewhat further, towards a theory of 
action proper. There is nothing unusual about this. Models for 
understanding the nature and dynamics of social action have 
been and remain key ingredients of sociological theorizing in 
the Grand Tradition, from Weber and Parsons to Bourdieu, 
Habermas and Giddens, to name just a few. Given my intention 
to use sociolinguistic insights in interaction as the core of 
theorizing, symbolic interactionism was obviously a source of 
inspiration, and I will repeatedly draw on Strauss’s (1993) very 
rich discussion of this tradition of social thought. 
Recalling the discussion in the previous chapters, one fun-
damental assumption I borrow from that source is straightfor-
ward: ‘Actions are in effect interactions between and among 
group members, not simply an individual’s actions or acts’ 
(Strauss 1993: 21, italics in original). Social action, in other 
words, is a verb. It is collective, is intersubjective, and involves 
orientations to norms; the concept of ‘genre’ can be a useful 
tool for capturing most of this in a very simple way.
Sociolinguistics has for decades been concerned with the 
notion of genre, as a historically established and socialized set 
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of linguistic-communicative features that enables specific forms 
of communicative behaviour to be recognized as, for instance, 
a joke, a lecture, a confession, a poem, a novel (Halliday 1978; 
Hymes 1981; Bakhtin 1986; Fabian 1991; Blommaert 2008c). 
From such evidence, we also know that all communicative 
behaviour is genred – or at least, that if we intend to make our 
communicative behaviour understood by others, it needs to 
be recognizable as an instance of a specific genre. Genre, thus, 
operates very much in the sense specified above: while every 
instance is unique and special, recognizability is generic, that is 
it rests on the iterativity of the ordered indexicals pointing to 
specific genres. Every novel is recognizable as ‘a novel’, but still 
we have our favourite novels.
This insight can be generalized. Social actions do not emerge 
from nowhere, nor can they be seen as pure acts of creativity. 
They are performances based on already existing sociocultural 
material, always uniquely contextualized and situated, and 
therefore involving a degree of creativity. So two dimensions 
are crucial here, for jointly they construct social actions as 
situated, performative genre work:
1 Iterativity: the usage of already existing genre templates
2 Creativity: the deviation from such templates in unique 
instances of genre performance
Iterativity provides what we can call the ‘structural’ aspect 
of social action. It ensures the recognizability of actions: 
they proceed largely within existing orders of indexicality 
that are interactionally understandable-as-something. 
Generic iterativity also turns situated social action into a 
fundamentally historical phenomenon – where does this 
iterated sociocultural material come from? How did it 
acquire its function as generic template? And thereby, of 
course, it should be seen as a crucial element in explaining 
sociocultural transmission, reproduction and spread.
Creativity provides what we can call the ‘diversity’ aspect 
of social action. It ensures the uniqueness of the situated 
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deployment and performance of genred features of action, 
of its participants, and of its chronotopic peculiarities – 
how and why does this particular situated instance of social 
action function in this particular way? Creativity, in that 
sense, can be seen as an ‘inflection’ of genre templates, as 
a term covering the small bits of deviation-from-a-model 
that turn the actual instance into something that triggers 
interactional uptake and appraisal. This particular lecture is 
nice, engaging and fun, versus boring, silly and uninteresting. 
It is still a lecture – the genre template has been satisfied – 
but it is a particular evaluated token of that type. Creativity, 
I add, is also the aspirational dimension of social action: 
the things we want to invent, or attempt to change, by 
small deviations from the normative templates. And while 
creativity usually only accounts for a relatively minor part 
of social action – it is an inflection of iterative templates – 
in everyday lived experience it prevails over the iterative 
basis of action. Our reactions and judgements of approval 
or rejection are based on the inflection, the ‘accent’, present 
in the uniquely performed act – which we can judge and 
react to because it is not entirely unique.
Thus, we can see any concrete social action as proceeding 
along lines of established normativity and deviations from 
such norms, as genred modes of collective conduct in which 
the sharedness of what makes actions recognizable is played 
off against the uniqueness of what is created by  deviations 
from what is commonly shared. Needless to say that longi-
tudinally, creative aspects of action may become iterative 
ones –  exceptions become rules when they have been made 
into  commonly ratified innovations.
There is a strong tendency (and theoretical habit) to see 
social action as singular, linear and goal-directed; Rational 
Choice, of course, takes this to its limits. This does not work.
1 Sociolinguistic studies of interaction have shown 
that actions are best seen as part of longer and more 
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complex sequences, in various ways (see e.g. Wortham 
and Reyes 2015). One, there is the intertextual nature 
of interaction, which aligns with the iterative aspect 
of social action. Actions are meaningful because 
they can be understood in relation to earlier similar 
ones (and projected onto future ones) (cf. Silverstein 
2005; Silverstein and Urban 1996). Two, what looks 
like one singular and coherent action may, upon 
closer inspection, prove to be an array of different 
overlapping but disjoined actions – and we get 
changeable constellations of genres-within-genres. 
A conversation may contain, for instance, moments 
of intimate narration, of disengaged small talk and 
of hostile cross-questioning (cf. Goffman 1981); and 
narratives done in, for instance, police or immigration 
interviews may simultaneously be recorded into legally 
consequential textual reporting formats – while the 
interviewer’s on-the-spot interactional routines would 
suggest nothing more than constructive conversational 
involvement, he or she might simultaneously be 
performing a procedural ‘next step’ practice very much 
detached from what goes on between the interlocutors 
during the interview (cf. Briggs 1997; Blommaert 
2005). Actions are rarely singular.
2 They are rarely linear as well. The creativity dimension 
of action also accounts for its contingent nature (in the 
sense of Garfinkel 1967): the inevitable indeterminacy, 
open-endedness and uncertainty characterizing any form 
of social action and manifesting itself in the very well-
known category of phenomena we call misunderstanding. 
Certainly when we consider the earlier point, about 
actions rarely being singular, we should assume that we 
often face what Anselm Strauss called ‘a cumulative mess’: 
‘an evolving set of problems that are so unanticipated, 
difficult, and in extreme cases so “fateful” that control 
of the course of action is threatened and even rendered 
virtually impossible’ (1993: 53). The normal course of 
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action is often disrupted (a lecture, for instance, by a 
beeping smartphone), the opening strategy rarely followed 
through (other than in apocryphal meeting reports), and 
people whom we believe to thoroughly know can still 
surprise us. Our interactions proceed in complex, layered 
contexts and in relation to (often changeable arrays of) 
other people, which renders their course uncertain and 
highly dependent on a wide range of factors, only part of 
which are within our conscious control.7
3 The latter has an effect on the question of the goal-
directedness of action. Conditions and effects are 
rarely cleanly aligned, and nonlinear outcomes of 
interaction are legion – think of people falling in 
love, or of people entering as friends and leaving as 
enemies. And while we may have a rational interest in 
mind when engaging in forms of interaction – think 
of employment as the rational interest one may have 
in a job interview – we can be quite irrational in 
interactional proceedings and depend as much on tacit 
emotively given-off and picked-up cues as on tightly 
argued moves – such that we may leave a job interview 
without the job but with a good feeling. We are ready 
to adjust our logic to that of the interlocutors and 
redefine the appropriate interactional features as 
well as the desired outcomes of interaction in trade-
offs with those of the others (e.g. Silverstein 1997; 
Rampton 2001; Goodwin 2007).
These qualifications gain weight when we consider current 
internet phenomena. In the iterative part of internet-based 
social action, the influence of algorithmic processes needs to be 
taken seriously. Such algorithmic processes are often described 
by means of terms such as ‘echochamber effects’ or ‘bubble 
effects’ (Pariser 2011; Tufekci 2015; van Nuenen 2016), 
and they refer to the fact that machines organizing activity 
in social media environments, create communities of people 
who (in the views of those designing such algorithms) should 
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‘share’ something – interests, social characteristics, opinions 
and so forth. Even if there is presently hardly a way in which 
we can profoundly and directly examine this (these algorithms 
are among the best-kept industrial secrets) there is little doubt 
that their effects reinforce and enlarge the iterative features 
of actions, perhaps pushing them even towards new levels 
of generic uniformity. Research on this is, as said, extremely 
difficult, but when investigating online actions, it is wise to 
keep an awareness that not everything we observe is an effect 
of deliberate human choice and agency, but an artefact of 
algorithmic agency.
This genre theory has methodological consequences: the va-
lidity of examples in analysis, including complex ones, rests 
on their generic recognizability, on the fact that through and 
 beyond their unique situatedness we can spot the larger, histor-
ical genre templates invoked in such social actions. Every in-
stance of social action is evidently unique, but only to a degree. 
For it is also generic, and in that sense always a token of a type, 
‘representative’ of that type. The genre theory, therefore, can 
be seen as the grounding for an ethnography that satisfies the 
demand both for ecological validity and for representativeness.
4.4 A microhegemonic theory 
of identity
Building on to what has been established so far, I now move on 
to two theories that are sides of the same coin: a theory of iden-
tity, followed by another one of social groups that essentially 
extends the former. While there is no sensible way in which we 
can talk of identity without talking about the social groups 
in which identities are performed and enregistered, I separate 
them here for clarity’s sake, because identity and social groups 
are, in many studies, isolated as separate domains of study.
Communicative practice is always and invariably an act of 
identity. Sociolinguists have taken this insight on board since 
Durkheim and the Internet.indb   56 12/16/2017   6:06:40 PM
 57WHAT DURkHEIM COULD NOT HAVE kNOWN
the mid-1980s (Le Page and Tabouret-Keller 1985), turning it, 
as Allan Bell observes, into one of the most productive topics 
of sociolinguistic research in recent years (Bell 2016). Very 
few sociolinguists need to be convinced of the performative 
and creative nature of identity (in other words, of identity not 
as a given but as something that emerges in social action); of 
its dialogical nature (creating a difference between enacted 
and ascribed identities), of the plurality of identities; of the 
dynamics of ‘serious’ and ‘ludic’ identity work prevalent in 
practices such as ‘styling’; and of identity as a problem central 
to a complex politics of performance and ascription (for 
surveys, see De Fina, Schiffrin and Bamberg 2006; Coupland 
and Jaworski 2009; sophisticated examples include Harris 
2006; Rampton 2006; Møller 2017). So here too, we can draw 
extensively on sociolinguistic insights.
This could be helpful, for the problem of categorization 
(another word for identity ascription) is an old one in social 
and humanities research, notably in quantitative ones where 
a degree of stability in research design is mandatory across 
the sample (Cicourel 1974). There is an assumption that every 
subject can (and perhaps should) be determined as to identity 
by describing him/her along essential bureaucratic parameters 
such as nationality, age, gender, social class, ethnicity, religious 
affiliation, profession – extended, sometimes, to include edu-
cational qualifications, income, family relationships, sexuality 
and health status. And this, let us note, is where we continue 
to feel the full weight of the Durkheimian tradition in research, 
for those are the diacritics of the modern ‘thick’ communi-
ties that have preoccupied macro-sociological research in the 
tradition we associate with him. The assumption, reformu-
lated, is that we can know and understand society when we 
divide it into segments and relationships based on these iden-
tity categories.
In contrast to that tradition, I propose to see identities as 
chronotopically organized moralized behavioural scripts; 
above I suggested the term ‘microhegemonies’ as shorthand for 
that contorted phrase. And I will explain what I mean by that.
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Let us recapitulate some of the elements in Sabrina Billings’s 
study of the role of language in Tanzanian beauty contests, 
discussed above. We saw how the use of language – particular 
forms of English, to be more precise – was a key part of a 
larger set of features deployed by the contenders and judged 
by the audience and the jury in relation to perceived norms 
of ‘good’ conduct in such events. In fact, what we saw was 
that ‘beauty queen’ – an ascribed identity category – needed 
to be performed by enacting a set of different, dispersed 
‘qualities’ – beauty, intelligence, education levels, humour – of 
which perceived fluency in ‘good’ English was emblematic. I 
emphasized that this normative system was polycentric and 
scaled, with local and nonlocal norms piled up onto one 
another, and that the judgement passed by the audience when 
one of the contenders failed to display the expected fluency in 
‘good’ English was a moral judgement of the entire person: she 
was seen and condemned as a phony.
The judgement, an identity judgement, was a moralization of 
the degree of normativity perceived in the contender’s display 
of a composite set of behavioural norms – a behavioural script 
that needs to be followed to some degree of satisfaction – 
which was specific to the occasion of the beauty pageant. It 
was chronotopic. 
The latter is of critical importance. We long know from a 
wide and highly diverse literature that people do not ‘have’ 
an identity but perform identities. In the observable conduct 
of people, there is no such thing as ‘identity’: we can observe 
concrete, situated and interactionally contextualized identity 
work. This contextualization is of paramount importance: we 
need to adjust our identity work to the highly specific demands 
of particular contexts. To unpack that last term: ‘context’, in 
actual fact, is a concrete time-space configuration in which 
particular forms of identity are expected, required or optional, 
and in which, consequently, we need to deploy highly particular 
resources drawn from what we can conveniently call ‘identity 
repertoires’ (cf. Blommaert 2005: 234; Blommaert and De 
Fina 2017). To put it concretely: the beauty pageant, with its 
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complex layered normative orientations to global and local 
diacritics of success and failure, is a specific chronotope. The 
contenders can only be given the identity of ‘beauty queen’ 
in the time-space configuration of the pageant; outside of it, 
a contender would be an office clerk, somebody’s daughter, 
a student, and what not. ‘Beauty queen’ and the behavioural 
scripts out of which it is constructed, are things that are specific 
to that one particular chronotope – just as bicycle racers can 
only call themselves ‘world champion’ when they have won 
one particular race, the world championship race. Identity 
work, in that sense, is never all over the place, it is very much 
connected to specific time-space niches.
Chronotopes help us get a precise grip on what we mean 
(referring back to Section 4.1) by mobility in this stage of 
online–offline globalization. We perpetually move from one 
chronotope into another, then back to the first and on to a 
third, and so forth. And we can describe in detail how such 
moves actually proceed, in physical as well as in sociocultural, 
politicized space. A shift from one chronotope into another, 
we can see, involves a massive shift in identity opportunities 
and criteria of judgement: what works well in one chronotopic 
environment may backfire in another, and vice versa. Lian Malai 
Madsen’s (2015) study of a martial arts club in Copenhagen 
is a case in point. The club is superdiverse in composition 
and counts a large number of young Copenhagers with a 
migration background. These youngsters are publicly seen 
and often described as ‘poorly integrated’ and marginalized 
both educationally and in the labour market. They are widely 
perceived as a social problem. But in the martial arts club, they 
are often the stars, the centres of attention and bearers of prestige 
and status as champions. In the club, we see a carnivalesque 
reversal of everything these youngsters are outside of it. Their 
skills, competences and patterns of performance – the same 
ones as those that give them the negative ascribed identities 
mentioned a moment ago – are valuated as fully integrated, 
as signs of extraordinary capability and even as exemplary 
models to be emulated by others.
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In Madsen’s study, we see quite profound identity shifts 
sequentially, as subjects move from one chronotope into an-
other one. Chronotopes can and do simultaneously overlap as 
well – this is one of the aspects of what I call polycentricity. A 
mathematics class, for instance, is of course an institutionally 
regimented chronotope in which form and contents are tightly 
scripted and policed by the teacher; but that class may at the 
same time be seen as a congregation of teenage peer groups, 
an entirely different chronotope following a (sometimes dra-
matically) different set of normative behavioural expectations 
than those imposed by the school and the teacher, and dis-
playing a highly different dynamics of identity as well. The 
underperforming student in the eyes of the teacher may be, 
because of exactly the same behavioural features, the coolest 
kid in class and a role model in the eyes of his/her peers. In 
fact, we can see Goffman’s (1959) famous distinction between 
‘front stage’ and ‘backstage’ as two simultaneously overlap-
ping chronotopes, each with their own modes of social action, 
identity affordances and systems of normative organization; 
and many of the interaction rituals he described can be recon-
sidered as microhegemonies specific to particular chronotopic 
environments as well (Goffman 1967, also 1961, 1981; see 
also Silverstein 2005). Goffman’s oeuvre, in fact, can be seen 
as a consistent engagement with how Americans in his time 
organized their social relations through forms of interactional 
behaviour adjusted to the chronotopes they inhabited – hence 
titles such as ‘Relations in Public’ or ‘The Lecture’(Goffman 
1971, 1981: Chapter 4). 
Goffman described the microhegemonies of an offline 
society. It is evident that the online social space has enabled a 
multiplication of available chronotopes and relations between 
chronotopes, and thus generates a wide range of new modes 
of identity work. Since a tremendous amount of research is 
presently in the process of being rolled out, I must confine 
myself here to a general summary of available insights, and 
start with some comments on the particular communicative 
practices we observe in the online world (for surveys see 
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Leppänen and Peuronen 2012; Androutsopoulos 2016; Varis 
and van Nuenen 2017: Leppänen, Westinen and Kytölä 2017). 
1 In a general sense, the emergence of online 
communication as a feature of everyday life has 
dramatically increased the importance of literacy, 
and more specifically of multimodal literacy. Online 
communication is overwhelmingly written (or 
‘designed’: Kress 2003; Jewitt 2013). Writing, as we 
know, is a field of normativity which is structured quite 
differently from spoken discourse – writing ‘errors’ 
are often treated with considerably less tolerance 
than errors in speech – but, at the same time, online 
writing practices display an incredible dynamism and 
innovativeness dislodging the traditional boundaries 
of ‘writing’ (and, evidently, those of language in its 
traditional sense). Consider the now widespread use of 
emoticons and expressions such as ‘OMG’ and ‘LOL’, 
the influence of AAVE-based hip-hop register in new 
genres of mobile and online communication (Kytölä 
and Westinen 2015), the complex blends of visual, 
textual, static and dynamic features of contemporary 
websites, and, especially, the phenomenon of ‘memes’ 
(Du 2016). People do very different things in and with 
semiotic material online, compared to what they do in 
offline contexts.
2 Much of what is done, especially on social media, 
appears to be what is known as phatic communion: 
the transmission and exchange of messages in which 
not propositional content (‘information’) appears to be 
a central concern, but the maintenance of ‘convivial’ 
social relations and the performance of specific acts 
of identity – that of, for example, a ‘friend’ by means 
of Facebook ‘likes’, a ‘follower’ by means of Twitter 
retweets, or just an ‘acquaintance’ by means of quick 
and short mobile messages (Miller 2008; Jones 2014; 
Varis and Blommaert 2013; Velghe 2013).
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3 The boundaries between online and offline social 
processes are porous. Registers of online activities such 
as Mass Online Games can spill over into the everyday 
vocabulary of gamers and become new indexicals for 
expressing social ties (Sierra 2016), and online activities 
become a learning environment where resources are 
built and circulated that are useful offline and now also 
profoundly influence such offline practices (Leppänen 
2007; Maly and Varis 2015; Blommaert 2016d). 
Conversely, offline identity features can influence 
the choice and use of specific online platforms and 
modes of conduct (boyd 2011). And, of course, new 
phenomena such as online dating are meant to go 
offline as soon as the first online steps have been 
completed (Toma 2016). The internet has also become 
an enormous repository of explicitly didactic and 
normative material – the ‘how to?’ genre – in which 
people can get clear instructions for how to perform 
specific forms of identity (Blommaert and Varis 2015).
4 Even so, online forms of self-presentation have 
characteristics and affordances of their own, not 
reducible to existing offline resources. Given the 
absence, in general, of face-to-face contact, people can 
hide behind an alias and construct entirely fictional 
personae for themselves – something that characterizes 
the darker side of the online social world (boyd 2014: 
100). But in more benign ways, there is a tendency to 
present oneself in the ‘my best day’ mode – the way 
one wishes to be perceived by others (Baron 2008: 
71; boyd 2014). There is also a plethora of new and 
reconfigured discursive genres, ranging from ‘Wiki’-like 
formats of collaborative writing to particular modes 
of confessional narrative, raising issues of privacy and 
the limits of self-exposure (cf. Page 2012; van Nuenen 
2016). The online world is a space where distinct forms 
of identity work can be performed, only distantly 
connected to what goes on elsewhere.
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In spite of this final remark, all of the above implies that 
quite a bit of contemporary identity work is carried over 
and oscillates between online and offline contexts, creating 
highly intricate connections between, for instance, what is 
microhegemonically expected or permitted in the chronotope 
of Facebook and that of the school playground (think of cyber 
bullying) or the workplace (think of employers monitoring 
employees’ social media accounts). The chronotopic nature of 
identities thus now evidently creates an enormous panorama 
of possible and expected identities, vastly more than those 
captured by the bureaucratic, ‘thick’ diacritics I mentioned at 
the outset. The variation of chronotopes we move through in 
social life demands, and endows us with, a plethora of ‘light’ 
identities, if you wish, not excluding the old and established 
‘thick’ categories but complementing them – ‘big’ diacritics 
such as race, gender, class or ethnicity are not absent, but they 
are performed in different and sometimes surprising ways (e.g. 
Rampton 2006; Harris 2006; boyd 2011; Goebel 2013, 2015; 
Wang 2015; Faudree 2015; Fox and Sharma 2016).
At the level of everyday experience, however, our identities 
and those of others depend strongly on details of behaviour and 
appearance, of which a certain amount needs to be displayed 
and performed – identities, one can see, are judged on the basis 
of perceptions of ‘enoughness’ (Blommaert and Varis 2015; 
also Goebel 2013). We can see a reflex of the genre theory 
of social action here: identity work is evidently genre-based, 
and it will display the same calibration between tendencies 
towards similarity and tendencies towards deviation as the one 
we encountered when we discussed genres. 
4.5 A theory of ‘light’ social groups
The discussion of identity already showed that the ‘thick’ 
diacritics of identity are not out, but that they are in need of a 
more delicate balancing with a wide range of other, ‘light’ forms 
of identity. To name just two, social class is not out, and neither is 
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ethnicity – but both are now imaginable as far more ‘styled’ than 
‘given’ identities, drawn from within a repertoire of identities 
that contains lots of different orientations. This obviously has a 
bearing on the discussion of social groups as well.
This discussion has a very long pedigree. Classics of sociology 
address society as their object, and attempt to find and express 
the rules that guide it. Sociology, it is said, is the science of 
society. How such a society should be defined, however, has 
been a consistent bone of contention since the very early days 
of sociology as a science. Generally speaking, authors reserve 
the term ‘society’ for the perceived permanent features of a 
social system, often (as by Durkheim and Parsons) ad hoc 
circumscribed by the nation-state. Such features were believed 
to be less subject to rapid or radical change – as distinct from 
features that were seen as superficial, transient or less reliable 
as indicators of social structure.
Here is what Georg Simmel had to say about it. Noting 
that the sociology of his era still had to prove its right to exist, 
notably against proponents of Methodological Individualism, 
Simmel emphasizes the fact of interaction as the eminently 
social phenomenon – see above – and then observes:
It is only a superficial attachment to linguistic usage (a 
usage quite adequate for daily practice) which makes us 
reserve the term ‘society’ for permanent interactions only. 
More specifically, the interactions we have in mind when we 
talk about ‘society’ are crystallized as definable, consistent 
structures such as the state and the family, the guild and the 
church, social classes and organizations based on common 
interests. (1950: 9, italics in original)
We have already encountered the same tendency towards 
preferring such ‘thick’ and permanent forms of organization 
in the work of Parsons, who focused on the governing 
pattern of values and their integrative effects to characterize 
society, while smaller and ‘lighter’ social groups were said to 
be tied together by norms – with the interactions between 
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both resulting, sometimes, in contradictions and disorder. 
This hierarchical ranking in which society is presented as 
organized, primarily, by strong ties within ‘thick’ communities 
such as those listed by Simmel (the state, church, etc.) and, 
secondarily, by ‘lighter’ ties within a plethora of social groups, 
of course did not prevent attention to the latter. But studies of 
smaller social sub-groups often articulated an awareness of 
their relatively superficial and ephemeral character. See, for 
instance, how Bourdieu and Passeron describe the Parisian 
student community of the 1960s:
The student milieu is possibly less integrated today than 
ever before. … Everything leads us, thus, to doubt whether 
students, effectively, constitute a homogeneous, independent 
and integrated social group. (1964: 54–5, French original, 
my translation)
Homogeneity, independence or autonomy, and level of 
integration, thus, decide the kind of social group formed by 
students: quite a poor one compared to, for instance, social 
class. And one should not be carried away by the lure of 
superficial groupness:
Students can have common practices, but that should not 
lead us to conclude that they have identical experiences of 
such practices, or above all a collective one. (Bourdieu and 
Passeron 1964: 24–5)
Precisely the same argument was used by Goffman in 
Encounters (1961) when he described poker players as a tightly 
focused community of people otherwise unacquainted, in 
which clear and transparent rules of conduct were shared (and 
assumed to be shared as soon as someone joins a poker game). 
Goffman saw such brief moments of tight but temporary and 
ephemeral groupness as aggregations of people sharing just 
the rules of the encounters, but little beyond it. Such ‘light’ 
groups, or ‘groupings whose boundaries we know very little 
about’ (Goffman 1971: xxiv), could be studied as a way to 
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arrive at insights into fundamental social procedures such as 
socialization and identity development (see e.g. Becker et al. 
1961 for a classic). But when it comes to understanding society 
(the real thing), attention should go to the ‘thick’ communities, 
and amendments to the established set of ‘thick’ communities, 
potentially dislodging the consensus about its consistency and 
stability, invariably led to considerable controversy.8
Simmel, we saw, expressed an awareness of the conventional – 
untheorized – nature of this consensus about the scope of 
‘society’. And after mentioning ‘the state and the family, the 
guild and the church, social classes and organizations based on 
common interests’ as the stereotypical arenas for ‘permanent 
interactions’, he goes on:
But in addition to these, there exist an immeasurable num-
ber of less conspicuous forms of relationships and kinds of 
interaction. Taken singly, they may appear negligible. But 
since in actuality they are inserted into the comprehensive 
and, as it were, official social formations, they alone pro-
duce society as we know it. … On the basis of the major 
social formations – the traditional subject matter of social 
science – it would be similarly impossible to piece together 
the real life of society as we encounter it in our experience. 
(Simmel 1950: 9)9
In other words – and here is a methodological invective of 
considerable importance – if we intend to understand ‘society 
as we know it’, we need to examine these ‘less conspicuous 
forms of relationships and kinds of interaction’ not instead 
of but alongside ‘the major social formations’. We can only 
get access to the necessarily abstract ‘society’ by investigating 
the on-the-ground micropractices performed by its members 
(called sociation by Simmel), taking into account that these 
micropractices may diverge considerably from what we believe 
characterizes society and may eventually show complex ties 
connecting practices and features of social structure (cf. Collins 
1981; Goffman 1971: 196).10
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The problem is familiar for sociolinguists: ‘Language’ with a 
capital L can only be examined by investigating its actual situ-
ated forms of usage; and while many prefer to define Language 
as a stable, autonomous and homogeneous object, the actual 
forms of usage are characterized by bewildering variability, 
diversity and changeability. I have already explained that, in 
addition, sociolinguists began to understand quite a while ago 
that very little can be learned from Language about the  actual 
social functions and effects of language. In other words: un-
derstanding what language is and does, in the  realities of so-
cial life, forces us to take the variable, diverse and dynamic 
actual forms of language usage (‘speech’) as our object, even if 
they cannot immediately be squeezed into a normative frame-
work of Language. Even more: a privileged site for research, 
offering analytical breakthroughs of momentous importance, 
is the small and highly heterogeneous peer group where the 
boundaries of languages, and of the ‘major social formations’, 
are blurred (e.g. Gumperz 1982; Rampton 2006; Harris 2006; 
Jørgensen 2008). 
Yet, recall the action theory sketched above: we should 
start from actions rather than from participants and 
their characteristics and put sociation ahead of society.11 
Sociolinguistics can offer a simple four-step methodological 
programme for empirical investigations into groups of any 
kind and configuration. Here it is:
1 Patterns of communication necessarily involve meaningful 
social relationships as prerequisite, conduit and outcome.
2 Such relationships will always, similarly, 
involve identities and categorizations, 
interactionally established.
3 Thus, when observing patterns of communication, 
we are observing the very essence of sociation and 
‘groupness’ – regardless of how we call the groups.
4 And specific patterns of interaction shape specific 
forms of groups.
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In this sociolinguistic frame, thus, we approach groups 
pragmatically and axiologically, from the angle of the actual 
observable communication practices and through the values 
attributed to such practices. Groups, then, are not collections of 
human beings but patterned sets of communicative behaviours 
and the relationships with which they are dialectically related. 
Whenever we see such ordered forms of communicative 
behaviour, there is an assumption of active and evolving 
groupness – sociation – but the analytical issue is not the nature 
of the group (or the label we need to choose for it) but the specific 
social relationships observable through and in communication – 
a Batesonian focus, if you wish, overtaking a Durkheimian one. 
All other aspects of sociation can be related to this. So if one 
needs the definition of a group: a group is a communicatively 
organized and ratified set of social relationships.
We can extend these insights now and bring them into the 
broader field of social action. The theoretical core of what 
follows can be summarized in this way:
1 Online social practices generate a broad range of 
entirely new forms of ‘light’ communities.
2 In the online–offline social contexts we inhabit, 
understanding social action requires attention to such 
‘light’ groups alongside ‘thick’ groups.
3 Because in the everyday lived experience of large 
numbers of people, membership of ‘light’ communities 
prevails over that of ‘thick’ communities.
4 ‘Light’ communities, thus, display many of the features 
traditionally ascribed to ‘thick’ communities. 
5 Even more: if we wish to comprehend contemporary 
forms of social cohesion, we need to be aware of 
the prominent role of ‘light’ communities and ‘light’ 
practices of conviviality as factors of cohesion.
Let me briefly elaborate the very first point. For those who 
wonder whether the internet has created anything new in the 
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way of social formations: yes, it has. Social media, in particular, 
have generated groups never previously attested: tremendously 
large communities of users, who – contrary to television 
audiences – actively contribute to the contents and interaction 
patterns of new media. Facebook’s 1.79 billion users constitute 
a media-using community that has no precedent in history; the 
approximately ten million people who play the mass online 
game World of Warcraft are another type of unprecedented 
community; and so are the 50 million people who use the 
Tinder dating app to find a suitable partner. 
All of these communities are formed by individuals voluntarily 
and actively joining them to perform entirely novel forms of 
social practice. Membership of such groups is experienced by 
many of its members as indispensable in everyday life, even 
if the practices performed in such groups would not always 
be seen as vital or indicative of one’s core identity – these are 
‘light’ groups and ‘ludic’ practices. But in addition to these 
voluntary communities, the internet generates involuntary 
communities through its algorithmic functions, bringing 
people together in networks of perceived shared interests and 
profiles, of which members are often unaware. The internet, 
thus, generates a range of new performed identities as well as 
a range of new ascribed identities; whereas the former usually 
function as spaces for interpersonal interaction and knowledge 
exchange among users, the latter’s function is opaque for the 
ascribed members, who are categorized in terms of third-party 
priorities ranging from marketing to intelligence gathering and 
security concerns.
Having established this elementary point, I must now turn 
to the online–offline nexus and review some relevant research 
on how the interplay of online and offline identity resources 
enables such specific forms of communities to be formed.
In a recent paper, Ico Maly and Piia Varis (2015) show 
how the now well-known urban ‘hipster’ communities must 
be seen as a typical instance of Appadurai’s vernacular glo-
balization. While hipsters have become a globalized phe-
nomenon, their actual occurrence, characteristics and social 
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positions are locally determined, jointly yielding a polynomic 
and  microhegemonic identity field. The global features of the 
groups are largely internet-based imageries of lifestyle, con-
sumption ethos, outlook and commodity orientation (think 
of the coffee cult, beards, skinny jeans, iPhones and vintage 
glasses as emblematic features), and the internet offers, as 
Maly and Varis demonstrate, an ocean of ‘how to’ resources 
for aspiring (or insecure) hipsters around the world. The inter-
net, thus, functions as a learning environment for the various 
norms that shape and police hipster culture. Included in such 
norms are fine discursive identity distinctions that refer to the 
hipster label itself:
We can thus distinguish social groups that dress like 
hipsters, share an identity discourse based on authenticity, 
and frequent hipster places. They distance themselves from 
another group of people they call hipsters: a ‘real’ hipster is 
someone who rejects being part of a social group, and thus 
also rejects the hipster label which is reserved for people 
who desperately want to be ‘hip’ and are thus not ‘real’ 
or authentic. Nor are they true innovators or trendsetters, 
which the individualistic, authentic hipsters are. (Maly and 
Varis 2015: 10)
Thus, there is a strong tendency to self-identify as a non-
mainstream, authentic, countercultural individualist, which, 
however, goes hand in hand with an exuberant and highly 
self-conscious neoliberal (and, thus, mainstream) consumer-
ism, scaffolded by a globalized ‘tight fit’ fashion industry. As 
an effect, this quest for individualism results in a remarkable, 
global, degree of uniformity. Hipsters are eminently recogniz-
able as hipsters, even if local accents do count and carry local 
identity values, and even if the usual fractality of orders of 
 indexicality allows for emerging subdivisions within hipster-
dom, such as the ‘mipster’ (Muslim Hipster).
Maly and Varis propose the term ‘translocal micro-
population’ to describe hipsters, and it is easy to think of 
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other globalized lifestyle communities for whom this label 
might be suitable – think of Hip-Hop, Rasta, Metal or Gothic 
communities, but also of ‘fashionistas’ and ‘foodies’, of Premier 
League soccer fans and so forth. All these micropopulations 
could be more finely described as groups of people who are 
translocally connected as what we could call communities of 
knowledge, while locally they occur as communities of practice. 
The latter term is better known, and Lave and Wenger (1991) 
used it to describe groups whose frequent interaction provides 
a learning environment for rules and norms – not unlike 
Goffman’s (1961) acquaintances in their encounters or Becker 
et al.’s (1961) medical school students – and knowledge is 
evidently, in Lave and Wenger’s view, an ingredient of practice. 
Theirs was, however, an ‘offline’ description, and what 
we see in the context of hipsters and other contemporary 
globalized lifestyle groups is that the internet has become an 
infrastructure for separate and specific forms of knowledge 
gathering and circulation not constricted by the experiences of 
face-to-face interaction, and so enabling a far wider scope and 
depth of scaled and polycentric community formation. We are 
facing a new type of social formation here: a ‘light’ community 
that differs from the ‘major social formations’ listed by Simmel, 
transcending the diacritics often thought to be essential in 
understanding social action, and (returning to Bourdieu and 
Passeron’s criteria of social groupness) displaying a high degree 
of homogeneity, autonomy, integration and structure over and 
beyond their diversity. We see, for instance, how such groups 
can be hierarchically structured, with ‘teachers’, ‘experts’ and 
‘learners’ in clearly defined relationships vis-à-vis each other, 
enacted through specific modes of interaction.
The capacity of the internet for generating such translocal 
communities of knowledge is immense, and we are only 
beginning to explore this phenomenon – and to take it 
seriously as a relevant feature of the sociological imagination. 
Such communities of knowledge are usually just that: online 
communities or ‘fora’ where information on an endless 
variety of topics is exchanged and debated, often through the 
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hierarchical learning relationships just mentioned (e.g. Kytölä 
2013; Hanell and Salö 2015; Mendoza-Denton 2015). But 
the internet has also enabled the emergence of a new form 
of translocal political community mobilization, and it is 
impossible to understand contemporary political and social 
dynamics without looking into such web-based communities 
of knowledge (cf. McCaughey and Ayers 2003; Graeber 2009). 
In fact, some of the most high-profile political events of the 
past decade were internet phenomena: Wikileaks and its release 
of hacked classified documents, the Panama Papers revealing 
shocking amounts of money hidden in offshore tax havens, 
and the alleged Russian hacking of the Democratic Party 
computers and its possible effect on the election of Donald 
Trump as US president in November 2016 (e.g. Brevini, Hintz 
and McCurdy 2013).12 And in recent years, communities that 
started online have won offline electoral victories as bona 
fide political parties – think of Syriza in Greece and Podemos 
in Spain.
Such processes of online community formation also occur 
where one would least expect it, and some of the most impressive 
findings come from China, a country known to maintain a 
restrictive internet censorship policy. Caixia Du’s (2016) study 
of the online activities of the Chinese precariat can serve to 
illustrate this. Due to China’s economic surge, millions of 
young and highly educated people have become employed in 
precarious administrative and technical jobs. These people, Du 
argues, share acute feelings of disenfranchisement: low income 
and insecure jobs have placed them in the margins of a society 
increasingly focused on material success and conspicuous 
consumption. Since they are digitally literate and since there 
are hardly any spaces for unimpeded sociopolitical dissidence 
in China, these people articulate and share their experiences 
online. Du describes how this large community – a ‘class in 
the making’ as she calls it – develops its own secret language 
through the clever manipulation of memes, sufficiently 
sophisticated to mislead the censor’s search engines. The 
community also constructs and shares an emblematic culture 
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called e’gao and revolving around parody and persiflage of 
prestigious cultural objects; and its members have created 
a distinct identity label for themselves: diaosi, a derogatory 
term signifying ‘losers’ (see also Li, Spotti and Kroon 2014; 
Yang, Tang and Wang 2015). These ‘soft’, cultural practices, 
Du insists, show the gradual coming into being of a previously 
non-existent social formation in China: a large precariat, 
critical of the government and billionaire elites and a potential 
source of large-scale social unrest in China. And all of this 
happens online.
‘Light’ communities, we can see, appear to have ‘thick’ 
characteristics and modes of practice. There are reasons to 
 believe, consequently that the ‘light’ practices that characterize 
so much of the online interactions – think of liking, endors-
ing, sharing, retweeting on social media – are not as light as 
one might think. Their main functions, one suggests, are the 
establishment and maintenance of relationships of conviviality 
(Varis and Blommaert 2013). But we should not forget that 
conviviality is an elementary and crucial form of social con-
duct within established communities – very much like greet-
ing neighbours or exchanging Christmas wishes with friends 
and relatives. They could as well be seen as ‘light’ practices 
with a ‘thick’ effect: social cohesion within online groups and, 
 increasingly, also spilling over into the offline world.
4.6 A polycentric theory of 
social integration
Integration continues to be used as a keyword to describe 
the processes by means of which ‘outsiders’ – immigrants, 
usually – need to ‘become part’ of their ‘host culture’. I have 
put quotation marks around three crucial terms here, and 
the reasons why will become clear shortly. Integration in this 
specific sense, of course, has been a central sociological concept 
in the Durkheim–Parsons tradition. A society is a conglomerate 
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of social groups held together by integration: the sharing of 
(a single set of) central values which define the character, the 
identity (singular) of that particular society (singular). And it 
is this specific sense of the term that motivates complaints – 
a long tradition of them – in which immigrants are blamed 
for not being ‘fully integrated’, or more specifically, ‘remaining 
stuck in their own culture’ and ‘refusing’ to integrate in their 
host society.
Half a century ago, in a trenchant critique of Parsons, C. 
Wright Mills (1959: 47) observed that historical changes 
in societies must inevitably involve shifts in the modes of 
integration. Several scholars documented such fundamental 
shifts – think of Bauman, Castells, Beck and Lash – but 
mainstream discourses, academic and lay, still continue to 
rely on the monolithic and static Parsonian imagination. In 
what follows I shall draw on the action-centred perspective 
developed above and propose that new modes of diaspora, 
now conditioned by access to new forms of mediated 
communication enabling new modes of interaction, do indeed 
result in new modes of integration.
To formulate this as a theoretical proposition: people are 
integrated in a wide variety of communities, both ‘thick’ and 
‘light’ ones, and to differing degrees. A ‘completely integrated’ 
individual is an individual who has achieved such diverse 
forms of integration and is able to move from one community 
to another while shifting between the modes of integration 
expected in each of them.
Let us look at some corroborating research. In a splendid 
dissertation, Jelke Brandehof (2014; for a similar study, see 
Nemcova 2016; also Tall 2004) investigated the ways in 
which a group of Cameroonian doctoral students at Ghent 
University (Belgium) used communication technologies in 
their interactions with others. She investigated the technologies 
proper – mobile phone and online applications – as well as the 
language resources used in specific patterns of communication 
with specific people. Figure 4.1 is a graphic representation of 
the results for one male respondent (Brandehof 2014: 38).
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This figure, I would argue, represents the empirical side 
of integration – real forms of integration in contemporary 
diaspora situations. Let me elaborate this.
The figure, no doubt, looks extraordinarily complex; yet 
there is a tremendous amount of order and nonrandomness 
to it. We see that the Cameroonian man deploys a wide range 
of technologies and platforms for communication: his mobile 
phone provider (with heavily discounted rates for overseas 
calls) for calls and text messages, Skype, Facebook, Beep, 
Yahoo Messenger, different VoIP systems, WhatsApp and 
so forth. He also uses several different languages: standard 
English, Cameroonian pidgin, local languages (called ‘dialects’ 
in the figure) and Fulbe (other respondents also reported 
Dutch as one of their languages). And he maintains contacts 
in three different sites: his own physical, economic and social 
environment in Ghent, his home environment in Cameroon, 
FIgURE 4.1 The communication network of a Cameroonian 
student in Ghent. Courtesy: Jelke Brandehof.
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and the virtual environment of the labour market in Cameroon. 
In terms of activities, he maintains contacts revolving around 
his studies, maintaining social and professional networks in 
Ghent, job-hunting on the internet and an intricate range 
of family and business activities back in Cameroon. Each 
of these activities – here is the order and nonrandomness – 
involves a conscious choice of medium, language variety and 
addressee. Interaction with his brother in Cameroon is done 
through smartphone applications and in a local language, 
while interactions with other people in the same location, on 
religious topics, are done in Fulbe, a language marked as a 
medium among Muslims.
As mentioned earlier, specific forms of interaction assume 
specific forms of sharedness and shape specific forms of 
groups. Our subject is integrated, through the organized use 
of these communication resources, in several groups situated 
in very different zones of social life. He is integrated in his 
professional and social environment in Ghent, in the local 
casual labour market where students can earn a bit on the side, 
in the Cameroonian labour market where his future lies, and in 
his home community. Note that I use a positive term here: he 
is integrated in all of these zones that make up his life, because 
his life develops in real synchronized time in these different 
zones, and all of these zones play a vital part in this subject's 
life. He remains integrated as a family member, a friend, a 
Muslim and a business partner in Cameroon, while he also 
remains integrated in his more directly tangible environment 
in Ghent – socially, professionally and economically. Note, 
of course, that some of these zones coincide with the ‘thick’ 
groups of classical sociology (the nation-state, family, religion) 
while others can better be described as ‘light’ communities – 
the student community, the workplace, web-based networks 
and so forth.
This level of simultaneous integration across groups, both 
‘thick’ and ‘light’ ones, is necessary. Our subject intends to 
complete his doctoral degree work in Ghent and return as a 
highly qualified knowledge worker to Cameroon. Rupturing 
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the Cameroonian networks might jeopardize his chances 
of reinsertion in a lucrative labour market (and business 
ventures) upon his return there. While he is in Ghent, part 
of his life is spent there while another part continues to be 
spent in Cameroon, for very good reasons. The simultaneity 
of integration in a variety of zones, however, should not lead 
us to suggest that the degrees of integration would be similar. 
We can assume that our subject is more profoundly integrated 
in, for instance, his family and religious communities in 
Cameroon, than in the Ghent-based casual labor market, 
where he needs to rely on the advice and support of others to 
find his way around.
I emphasized that our subject has to remain integrated 
across these different zones – sufficiently integrated, not 
‘completely’ integrated. And the technologies for cheap and 
intensive long-distance communication enable him to do so. 
This might be the fundamental shift in ‘modes of integration’ 
we see since the turn of the century: diaspora no longer 
entails a total rupture with the places and communities of 
origin; neither, logically, does it entail a ‘complete integration’ 
in the host community, because there are instruments that 
enable one to lead a far more gratifying life, parts of which 
are spent in the host society while other parts are spent 
elsewhere. In short, here is a textbook example of Castells’s 
‘network society’ (1996). We see that diasporic subjects keep 
one foot in the ‘thick’ community of family, neighbourhood 
and local friends, while they keep another foot – on more 
instrumental terms – in the host society and yet another one 
in ‘light’ communities such as internet-based groups and the 
casual labour market. Together, they make up a late-modern 
diasporic life.
There is nothing exceptional or surprising to this: the 
jet-setting European professional business class members 
do precisely the same when they go on business trips: 
smartphones and the internet enable them to make calls 
home and to chat with their daughters before bedtime, 
and to inform their social network of their whereabouts by 
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means of social media updates. In that sense, the distance 
between Bauman’s famous ‘traveller and vagabond’ is 
narrowing: various types of migrants are presently using 
technologies previously reserved for elite travellers. And 
just as the affordances of these technologies are seen as an 
improvement of a nomadic lifestyle by elite travellers, it is 
seen as a positive thing by these other migrants, facilitating 
a more rewarding and harmonious lifestyle that does not 
involve painful ruptures of existing social bonds, social roles, 
activity patterns and identities.
What looks like a problem from within a Parsonian theory 
of ‘complete integration’, therefore, is in actual fact a solution 
for the people performing the ‘problematic’ behaviour. The 
problem is theoretical, and rests upon the kind of monolithic 
and static sociological imagination criticized by C. Wright Mills 
and others, and upon the distance between this theory and the 
empirical facts of contemporary diasporic life. Demands for 
‘complete integration’ (and complaints about the failure to do 
so) can best be seen as nostalgic and, when uttered in political 
debates, as ideological false consciousness – or more bluntly, as 
sociological surrealism.
4.7 Constructures
In social science, social structure is very often used as a 
target of analysis – one intends to say something about the 
‘structural’ level of social organization. And it is also often 
used as a methodological tool – one identifies a level of social 
reality called ‘structure’, and such structures contribute to the 
analysis of the case examined. Some of the most epochal and 
influential social-scientific work was work addressing just 
that: the emergence and solidification of structural dimensions 
of society – think of the work of Parsons (1937) or that of 
Giddens (1984). Structure, it seems, is the most ‘macro’ 
dimension of social life, and ‘structural’ is the most general 
level of statements made in its analysis. In Fernand Braudel’s 
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famous distinctions between time-scales, the structural 
was situated in the realm of the longue durée: the time of 
civilizations, of modes of production, of the climate and the 
demography of parts of the world (e.g. 1969, 1981). And for C. 
Wright Mills and several others – think of Weber and Parsons 
– social structure could be described mainly by attention to 
the institutional orders within the nation-state, and ‘if we 
understand how these institutional orders are related to one 
another, we understand the social structure of a society’ (Mills 
1959: 134). The consensus appears to be that structure refers 
to phenomena at the level of ‘the total society’ (Mills 1959: 
137) and shows a persistent, slowly developing character. In 
that sense, work such as that of Appadurai (1996) and Castells 
(1996) addresses newly emerging structures. By the same 
token, of course, teleological models of social evolution, such 
as those of Hegel and Marx, would be structural.
One will have some difficulty finding detailed descriptions 
of what ‘structure’ actually is, how it can be empirically iden-
tified and how it relates to the chaotic specifics of the every-
day social processes we can observe. Attempts such as those 
of  Giddens – who was explicit in his definitions of structure – 
remain open to critique and controversy (see e.g.  Thompson 
1984: Chapter 4). Mostly, ‘structure’ is used in a loosely de-
fined way in the sense I outlined above. And once more, if we 
use what we know about language in social life as the funda-
mental imagery for social science, we may offer a somewhat 
more precise set of formulations.
Let me first sketch the field of arguments in which I shall 
situate my proposals. I wish to keep my distance from two 
quite widespread frames of reference for discussing structure.
1 First, I want to avoid a particular tradition of 
interpretation of ‘structure’. ‘Structure’, certainly 
in a Lévi–Straussian variety of structuralism, 
has acquired strong suggestions of absoluteness, 
abstractness, predictability, anonymity, a-temporality 
and staticity. Structure, as the guiding value system 
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of a society, is that which provides enduring stability 
to a social system and makes it resilient – as Parsons 
suggested – to the onslaught of cultural revolutions 
from within youth culture (Parsons 1964). And even 
if structure is the outcome of active structuration at 
a variety of scale levels in social life (Giddens 1984; 
Thompson 1984), most scholars would still use 
the term to describe dominant (if not determining) 
rules, values or principles driving the development 
of societies across time-space. It is also quite often 
presented as a social force operating below the level 
of consciousness and agency of people, a set of tacit 
and not always ‘emicly’ well-understood aspects of 
social life – as in the ‘deep structure’ of Chomskyan 
transformational grammar.
2 Two, I want to avoid a particular set of discursive 
associations. ‘Structure’ is often seen as something 
antagonistic to ‘postmodernist’ and ‘mobility/
complexity’ approaches to social life. While traditional 
(‘modernist’) social science would be on the side of 
anonymous static structure, ‘postmodernist’ science 
would favour individual agency and instability, and 
thus would become at once ‘poststructuralist’ – in an 
unrealistic either/or frame in which methodological 
preferences appear to lead directly to ontological 
strictures.13 It is rarely observed that ‘poststructuralist’ 
scholars such as Bourdieu and Foucault did not just 
reject any concept of structure but rejected a specific 
one: the Lévi–Straussian concept referred to above. 
They rejected a certain kind of structuralism (and their 
‘poststructuralism’ would be more accurately defined 
as ‘post-Lévi-Straussism’) but not ‘the structural’ as a 
dimension of social systems.
In general, this false antagonism often renders more nuanced 
and precise understandings of structure invisible. Many fail 
to recognize that complexity is not the absence of order, but 
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a different kind of order. I shall therefore use another term 
to make my point. Rather than using ‘structure’, I shall use 
constructure in what follows. New terms enable us to examine 
the validity of the older ones, and they also afford some measure 
of detachment from unwarranted intertextual readings. 
‘Constructure’ is not technically speaking a neologism – it is an 
archaic term that offers a felicitous collocation of ‘structure’ 
and ‘construction’. The latter term, as can be seen, can easily 
be changed into ‘agency’, and so we have a concept in which 
both dimensions, often seen as antagonistic, are heuristically 
and analytically joined, and in which the layered historicity of 
social processes can be captured.
The baseline assumption – which, I hope, is entirely uncon-
troversial – is that any social event is structured: there is  always 
‘order’ in any observed social event. But from a complexity 
perspective on sociolinguistic phenomena and processes, this 
order is always:
1 Dynamic and unstable: order is always a temporally 
contingent quality because systems are perpetually 
unfolding and changing (e.g. describing language at 
one point in time will necessarily result in a description 
which is different from what was current a generation 
ago as well as from what will be current in the 
next generation).
2 Unfinished and stochastic: given the perpetual change, 
any momentary observation of order will contain open-
ended, quickly evolving features anticipating new forms 
of order; it will also contain features that are contested 
and conflictual, and features in the process of being 
eliminated or established (e.g. archaisms and neologisms, 
short-lived as well as more lasting ones, are always 
part of any synchronic observation of language). It is 
stochastic in the sense that today’s structure might be 
yesterday’s exception, and that outcomes are quite often 
not predictable from initial conditions but ‘accidental’ or 
deviant in terms of what was seen as dominant.
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3 Non-unified: any form of order consists of a mixture 
of different forces, developing at different speeds 
and with different scope and range (e.g. the different 
registers in anyone's repertoire have different speeds of 
development, with ‘standard’ registers usually slower in 
development than, for example, youth registers – hence 
our sense of ‘trendiness’).
As just noted, we are used to reserve the term ‘structure’ 
for the slower, more persistent forces, the durée, the macro 
dimension of social processes. I suggest we avoid this micro–
macro distinction and consider the entire mix when we use 
the term ‘constructure’. Given the complexity perspective, 
there is no telling a priori which of the features in the mix 
will determine future developments – change often happens in 
the margins and begins as a statistical minority or exception, 
often negatively qualified or overlooked. Think of the 
spectacular rise of emoticons as part of several mainstream 
genres of writing nowadays. Emoticons have not replaced 
the conventional forms of alphabetic writing – we still write 
(roman-alphabetically, at least) from left to right, and we still 
use the conventional orthographic symbols we associate with 
the written form of the language we are using. Emoticons have 
been added to the mix of contemporary writing, so to speak; 
they represent what we could call a ‘light’ feature, blended 
with the ‘thick’ features of conventional orthography. In terms 
of functions, too, we should not associate ‘structure’ a priori 
with ‘thick’ functions but do justice to ‘light’ functions such 
as that of conviviality, discussed above. They are, as we saw, 
only light from the kind of transcendental structuralism I 
dismissed earlier.
Constructures are, thus, a permanently unfolding mix 
of various separate structures, the momentary deployment 
of which in social practice grants the latter a degree of 
orderliness, recognizable and ratifiable for others. Going 
back to our theory of social action, we can see how in 
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constructures, we can unify traditional notions of structure 
and agency. Rephrased, we have a tool for recognizing the 
two essential characteristics of social action – iterativity and 
creativity. Recall, most of the behaviour we deploy socially 
is overwhelmingly iterative, but slightly inflected by unique, 
creative and situated performativity. Observe, however, 
that I do not equate iterativity with stability and creative 
performativity with change. The entire mix is continuously 
changing, including the ‘iterative’ aspects of it. Detaching the 
performative ‘accent’ from the iterative ‘structure’ obscures 
the fact that, for people in everyday practice, the ‘accent’ is 
often the essence of what they perceive as meaningful in social 
action. And it is by means of the performative ‘accent’ that 
the iterative features of behaviour are also transformed into 
unique and creative characteristics of specific social actions 
performed by specific people. All of this was made clear 
earlier when we discussed the genre theory of social action; its 
relevance here is evident.
Rather than as a concept that points towards the stability of 
social systems – the simplistic interpretation of structure, noted 
above – constructure thus points to the permanently changing 
nature of social systems and to the way they change. This 
might explain why parts of past reality remain recognizable 
while other parts are not. When we read Erving Goffman’s 
observations on social life in the United States of the 1950s 
and 1960s, for instance, we can still recognize a great deal of 
it today, even if much of our social life these days is performed 
in a social space that did not exist in Goffman’s world: the 
virtual space of social media. Interaction in this virtual world 
is organized along different sets of norms many of which 
differ strongly from the ones Goffman detected in face-to-face 
engagements. Online sociality, however, has not replaced the 
Goffmanian world of social interaction – the mix has changed, 
which is why we can still recognize ourselves in Goffman’s 
work, even if we realize that large chunks of our lives are led in 
very different ways. The constructures have changed.
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4.8 Anachronism as power
Finally, I also propose a theory of power; not a general theory of 
power per se but a specific one, about one kind of institutional 
power. Two points of departure underlie the effort here.
1 In The Utopia of Rules, David Graeber describes 
the fundamental stupidity of contemporary 
bureaucratization, observing the spread of what he 
calls ‘power without knowledge’, ‘where coercion 
and paperwork largely substituted for the need 
for understanding … subjects’ (2015: 65). The 
contemporary power of bureaucrats often involves 
an assumption of total knowledge (articulated, e.g. 
in Foucault’s work). Graeber, however, disagrees: 
‘Situations of structural violence invariably produce 
extremely lopsided structures of imaginative 
identification’ (69). Rulers have no clue about who 
and what their subjects are, what it is they do, 
what they attach importance to, how they live. The 
schematization and simplification of bureaucracy 
serve as a substitute for intimate and experience-based 
knowledge but evidently fail to match up to that.
2 A decent amount of applied-linguistic work, notably on 
bureaucratic procedures such as asylum applications, 
shows how transnational subjects, often carrying the 
traces of a chequered diasporic biography, are caught 
in entirely unrealistic administrative templates in 
which their ‘origins’ are determined on the basis of 
imaginations of nation-state regimes of bureaucratic 
identity and on ‘modernist’ theories of language 
(cf. Maryns 2006; Blommaert 2001, 2009; Jacquemet 
2015). To put it concretely: if applicants’ claims as 
to origin (being from country X) are being disputed, 
knowledge of the official, national languages of 
Country X is used as a definitive test. If one fails this 
criterion, asylum is being denied. The same happens 
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whenever an applicant provides discourse which is 
sensed to violate the rules of denotational purity: 
whenever he or she produces contradictions, silences, a 
muddled chronology or a lack (or overload) of detail, 
the applicant is judged to be untrustworthy and the 
success of his or her application is jeopardized.
The ‘lopsided structures of imaginative identification’ 
described by Graeber, we can see, in actual fact assume the 
shape of anachronisms: schemes of social imagination, and 
thus of patterns of meaning-making, perhaps valid in an earlier 
stage of development, but not adjusted to recent changes and 
thus inadequate to do justice to the phenomenology of present 
cases. At the same time, these obsolete schemata are strongly 
believed to have an unshakeable, persistent relevance as a 
rationality of administrative information-organization, and are 
enforced from within that rationality. Thus, an important part 
of contemporary institutional power is based on anachronisms.
Anachronisms are, of course, an inevitable feature of social 
change, and we know that governmentality – the logic of insti-
tutional bureaucracy and governance – is widely characterized 
by inertia. It represents a segment of society which develops 
more slowly than the segments it is supposed to deal with. The 
gap between the phenomena to be addressed and the schemata 
by means they are addressed are a grey zone of uncertain un-
derstanding and often arbitrary judgement – and thus, increas-
ingly, of miscarriage of justice and of contestation. In terms 
of research, such anachronistic gaps offer a very rich site for 
investigating social change itself, based on the general image 
of ‘constructural’ social change described above: an image of 
different layers developing at different speeds. The different 
speeds manifest themselves in actual, situated cases of misun-
derstanding (or rather: the incapacity for understanding) and/
or of experienced injustice.
The awareness of anachronisms is nothing new, needless 
to say. Durkheim’s own efforts, we have seen, were grounded 
in his conviction that society had not been adjusted to an 
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important range of innovations caused by the industrialization 
and urbanization of France. Similar views of an old social order 
being crushed under the weight of a new one are widespread in 
the sociological literature. What this theory of anachronisms 
as power now offers, is accuracy. When earlier generations 
saw their societies being ill adapted to innovation, they could 
not possibly mean all of society, for the parts that had been 
innovated were also very much part of that society. What we 
can contribute, therefore, is a highly precise focus when we 
look at such phenomena. The anachronisms are particular 
modes of organizing social interaction through specific patterns 
of meaning-making: categorization, the connection of different 
phenomena, objects or persons in specific sets of relationships 
to each other (as when an asylum seeker is brought in a certain 
relationship with national languages in determining his or her 
origins), patterns of argumentation and the ways in which we 
attribute judgements of persuasiveness to certain such patterns. 
My proposed theory enables us to look for very precise objects 
of analysis that can document change and the anachronistic 
effects that accompany it.
Evidently, the internet as an infrastructure for substantial 
innovation in the modes of social interaction, is prone to such 
anachronisms. It is a segment of contemporary social life that 
develops at very high speed, while our modes of meaning-
making are slow to be synchronized. Thus, we talk about, and 
in, new modes of internet communication very much in ways 
reflecting a pre-internet complex of social relationships. A very 
clear and simple example of this is the fact that Facebook, the 
largest social media platform in the world founded in 2004, uses 
one of the oldest and most primitive terms in the vocabulary 
for human relationships as its core tool: ‘friends’. Evidently, 
Facebook ‘friends’ are not necessarily coterminous with offline 
friends. Facebook also uses a similarly ancient and primitive 
term to describe the most common interaction function on 
its platform: ‘like’. And evidently, this ‘like’ function covers a 
very broad and extraordinarily heterogeneous range of actual 
meanings. No one needs to actually like an update in order to 
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‘like’ it, and no one needs to be an actual friend in order to 
become a Facebook ‘friend’ (which is why one can be easily 
and swiftly ‘defriended’ whenever differences of opinion arise).
Those are of course innocuous phenomena, merely indexing 
the anachronistic gaps caused by developments in social media. 
Less innocent, but very difficult to pinpoint, are the effects of 
some of the organizing principles behind social media: the 
algorithmic engines used by, for example, Google and Facebook 
to bring people, messages and zones of social activity together 
on the basis of aggregations of huge amounts of (‘big’) data and 
metadata generated by users. These algorithms, as mentioned 
earlier, cannot be directly examined. But some of their effects 
are known. All of us, I am sure, have at times error-clicked some 
advertisement on a social media page – say, an advertisement 
for the newest model of urban SUV by Peugeot. All of us 
must have noticed how in the days following that erroneous 
click, multiple automobile advertisements appear on almost 
any page we open, usually cars in the same price range as the 
Peugeot we error-clicked. Less visible, perhaps, is the fact that 
in our social media newsfeeds, we are likely to encounter more 
people who recently clicked such advertisements in the days 
following our error-click, most likely people from our contacts 
network and people in the same geographical area as us. And 
also less visible, perhaps, is the fact that our perceived interest 
in cars of a certain brand and price range will be correlated 
with other data we produce through our social media usage 
– other products we express an interest in, other aspects of 
lifestyle, other persons, perhaps political views or preferences 
for certain sports or sports teams – all of this resulting in a 
permanently updated ‘algorithmic identity’, of certain interest 
for marketing and security professionals, over which we 
ourselves do not have any control, let alone agency.14
Although we can, as I said, gauge these procedures from 
a distance only, we can infer from what we know that these 
algorithms are anachronisms too. They are overwhelmingly 
linear and reductionist: linear, for clicking an item is interpreted 
as necessarily rational and deliberate – the mind-reading 
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procedures of the algorithm (manifestly Rational Choice-
based) exclude the possibility that we clicked the button by 
accident, and reductionist, in the sense that clicks are seen 
as inspired by very specific forms of interest in the thing we 
clicked – an interest, for instance in buying that object rather 
than just admiring it or confirming our opinion that such 
things are absurdly expensive. The algorithmic identities thus 
ascribed to us may be light years removed from the actual 
motives driving our social conduct and from the ways in which 
we see ourselves. Well known, for instance, is that at a certain 
time when terrorism alert worldwide was red-hot, googling for 
information on pressure cookers was algorithmically flagged 
as suspicious because these mundane receptacles happened 
to be widely used in manufacturing home-made explosive 
devices. Which is an activity performed, fortunately, by very 
few individuals. But in order to locate these individuals, a great 
many more must have come under close scrutiny by security 
and intelligence officials – for no reason other than, perhaps, 
they contemplated buying a very nice pressure cooker so as to 
boost the quality of their bowl of evening soup.
Patterns of human interaction and meaning-making are the 
most sensitive indicators of social change; every neologism in 
our everyday language usage demonstrates this. If we wish 
to understand the fine grain of social change, close attention 
to these patterns is therefore sure to offer far more analytical 
purchase than almost any other aspect of social life. Power, 
too, can be investigated by looking at the anachronisms 
characterizing patterns of interaction and meaning-making 
deployed in governance; it can be looked at in very great detail.
Notes
1 One can invoke the authority of Arjun Appadurai here: ‘This 
theory of a break – or rupture – with its strong emphasis on 
electronic mediation and mass migration, is necessarily a theory 
of the recent past (or the extended present) because it is only 
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in the past two decades or so that media and migration have 
become so massively globalized, that is to say, active across large 
and irregular transnational terrains’ (1996: 9).
2 I reiterate here an assumption already voiced by Anthony 
Giddens (1976: 127): ‘Language as a practical activity is 
so central to social life that in some basic respects it can be 
treated as exemplifying social processes in general’ (italics in 
original). This assumption, in Giddens’s work, does not lead to 
a structured attention to this ‘practical activity’, though. See the 
discussion in J.B. Thompson (1984: Chapter 4).
3 It can therefore also be read as the core of ‘superdiversity’ as a 
research programme. See Arnaut (2016); Arnaut, Karrebæk and 
Spotti (2017); Blommaert and Rampton (2016).
4 Odile Heynders (2016), in an insightful study, examines how 
such diasporic public spheres have altered the nature and impact 
of writers as public intellectuals. A variety of ‘traditional’ social 
roles is affected by this transformation of the public sphere in 
which global rock star status is no longer the privilege of sports 
and entertainment professionals (including US presidents), but 
now includes the likes of Thomas Piketty, author of a not-too-
easily-readable book. Piketty is not the first scientist reaching 
global celebrity status in spite of the fact that very few of his 
admirers are able to say what exactly he is arguing for in his 
work – think of Einstein a century ago – but his fame remains 
a very rare phenomenon, certainly in a culture in which 
argumentative complexity is increasingly dispreferred.
5 It is very much worth underscoring this, because of the 
exceedingly abstract (and unrealistic) ways in which norms 
and values are being discussed in much academic work and 
most public debate. Durkheim’s own perspective, to his credit, 
was radically empirical and opposed to a priori generalization 
(Durkheim 1961: 26).
6 One can profitably compare the view articulated here with 
Agha’s (2007b) concept of ‘stereotypes’ (or ‘models’, Gal 
2016) – indexical complexes to which we orient whenever we 
communicate and that provide the referenced ‘type’ of identity 
of which we provide ‘tokens’ in our actual communicative 
conduct. One will find amidst overwhelming agreement two 
small differences. I emphasize the scaled multiplicity of such 
‘stereotypes’ – the polynomic nature of social conduct – and 
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suggest a far broader behavioural field of ratification and uptake 
to be in play. In that sense, I am more inclined towards symbolic 
interactionism than Agha would, I presume, allow.
7 Read, for instance, Goffman’s famous discussion of ‘tie-signs’ 
(signs that provide information on the social ties between 
people, such as e.g. holding hands). Goffman explains that 
while tie-signs are a culturally encoded resource for identity 
and social relationship checking, the work of such checking 
is fraught with complications: ‘In Western society tie-signs 
tend to be inherently ambiguous in the sense that signs can 
designate relationships of different name, different terms, and 
different stage – or can entirely and intentionally mislead’ 
(Goffman 1971: 196).
8 One can think of the many energetic debates throughout the 
twentieth century on the concept and validity of social class as 
a key sociological notion. Attempts towards ‘inventing’ new or 
additional social classes were consistently met with hostility – 
see, for examples, C. Wright Mills’s (1951) description of an 
emerging ‘White Collar’ class, and Guy Standing’s (2011) 
proposal for seeing the ‘precariat’ as a class-on-the-way-in.
9 With this quote Erving Goffman opened his PhD dissertation, 
and much of Goffman’s work can thus be seen as engaging with 
the baseline ‘sociation’ processes Simmel outlined, developing 
within ‘less conspicuous forms of relationship and kinds of 
interaction’. I am grateful to Rob Moore for pointing this out 
to me.
10 We see affinities here between Simmel’s methodological view and 
phenomenology, especially Husserl’s discussion of the ‘life-world’ 
as the subjective basis for objectivity (Backhaus 2003).
11 I echo here the critique of Goodwin and Goodwin (2004) 
against Goffman’s (1981) famous distinctions between 
participants, that left their basic preconceived interactional roles 
intact (with ratified vs. unratified participants, for instance, still 
remaining preconceived as ‘hearers’). The Goodwins suggested 
focusing on the actual activities performed by participants 
in interactions, allowing for a much more fine-grained set of 
distinctions a posteriori.
12 Trump’s own media strategy is sure to become a topic of 
research in future years as well. Trump systematically rejected 
what he called ‘mainstream mass media’, claiming they were 
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biased, and waged an intensive social media campaign – leading 
to frequent allegations of ‘fake news’. See Maly (2016) for a first 
appraisal.
13 Nik Coupland walks into the trap of such false antagonism: ‘We 
may have reached a metatheoretical peak in the fetishising of 
mobility and the antagonistic critiquing of structure, stability, 
and stasis’ (2016: 440 and discussion 440–2).
14 The link between these issues and security concerns cannot be 
explored fully here, but has been extensively documented and 
discussed in, for example, Rampton 2016b; Charalambous et al. 
2016; Khan 2017.
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CHAPTER FIVE
The sociological  
re-imagination
The world that was puzzling Durkheim has changed and has 
become the world puzzling Castells and Appadurai. It has 
changed constructurally: parts of that old world persist while 
entirely new parts have entered it, most prominently a new 
global infrastructure for sociality – the internet – which affects 
the entire planet, including those segments of it where it is rare 
or absent. The interplay of these different parts demands a new 
sociological imagination, and my effort towards that goal was 
guided by a simple assumption: that a number of insights into 
contemporary patterns of social interaction can be generalized 
and provide a sociolinguistically animated re-imagination 
of the social world, characterized by what Arjun Appadurai 
called vernacular globalization. 
Recall what Appadurai meant by this delicate concept: the 
fact that globalized societies (and there are none that are not 
globalized) must be comprehended through the interplay of 
large and small structures, through disciplined attention to the 
big translocal things and their interactions with the small local 
ones – what Arnaut, Karrebæk and Spotti (2017) aptly call the 
‘poeisis-infrastructures nexus’. This nexus is the intersection 
of locally contextualized practices of meaning-making with 
higher-scale conditions for meaning-making. The very object 
of sociolinguistics, in other words. And what sociolinguistics 
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The sociological re-imagination
contributes to social science is precisely that: a meticulously 
empirical perspective on this nexus, in which the object is the 
nexus itself and not its – artificially and counterproductively 
established – ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ dimensions. No contempo-
rary sociolinguist can afford to examine the facts of language 
in society without considering simultaneously and as part of 
the same phenomenon, the ‘micro’ facts of situated discourse 
and their ‘macro’-sociolinguistic conditions of becoming and 
deployment (cf. Blommaert 2005, 2010). This nexus–object 
enables us now to propose an empirically grounded (and 
thus non-speculative and non-‘metaphysical’) sociological 
re- imagination – an imagery in which ‘the framework of mod-
ern society is sought, and within that framework the psycholo-
gies of a variety of men and women are formulated’, to repeat 
C. Wright Mills’s famous words.
Sociolinguistics does, however, more than that. Theories 
derived from its evidence cannot subscribe to Methodological 
Individualism (let alone Rational Choice), as I hope to have 
established in Chapter 3. They are inevitably grounded in 
that essential and irreducible social dimension of human life: 
interaction between people in a comprehensible, and therefore 
shared, meaningful code following a set of grammars as I 
called it earlier. All the theories I have proposed here, therefore, 
contradict and invalidate individualistic views of human 
behaviour, including so-called neoliberal (or ‘postmodern’) 
views of unconstrained social action and unrestricted agency. If 
action is interaction, it is only partially open to choice, and it is 
entirely controlled and constrained by the resources available 
and accessible to the interlocutors and to normative-evaluative 
uptake by others. Our freedom as social agents, to paraphrase 
this in a different jargon, is seriously curtailed (and has to 
be) as soon as we try to communicate it to others. It remains 
perplexing to see that a part of social theory has not come to 
terms with this elementary – defining – fact of communication.
There will be those who ask ‘where is power in your the-
ories?’ The answer is: everywhere. Sociolinguistic evidence, 
in my view, compels us to embrace Foucault’s conception of 
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 power as dispersed, norm-focused and capillary, present in 
every aspect of social behaviour, and crystallized – often in the 
form of anachronisms (see section 4.8 above) – in contempo-
rary modes of institutional governmentality. The latter produce 
and reproduce, let us note, significant amounts of infrastruc-
tural violence (Rodgers and O’Neill 2012), by policing access 
to the normative resources that (often tacitly, as in the case of 
standard forms of language and literacy: Hymes 1996) condi-
tion the realization of what Bourdieu (1982) called ‘legitimate 
language’. The same goes for those resources that control, as 
do the algorithms and ‘big data’ directing social media traf-
fic, the shaping of communities and the ascribed identities of 
their members. The indexical-polynomic organization of nor-
mativity in communication makes power total and inevitable 
across the entire spectre of observation. I believe we need such 
a view to start addressing – not a minute too soon – the new 
forms of power, inequality and conflict that now characterize 
the online–offline world and of which people such as Edward 
Snowden, Julian Assange and Chelsea Manning, but also Don-
ald Trump, are uncomfortable reminders.
The same answer will be given to those asking ‘where are 
gender, race, class, ethnicity in your approach?’ There, too, 
we must see that such diacritics are always present, but rarely 
alone, usually as part of a polynomic and polycentric pattern of 
social action in which they co-occur with several other identity 
resources. As I repeatedly underscored, the ‘big’ sociological 
category diacritics are not absent (certainly not when we 
consider institutional governmentality) but they are as a 
default chronotopically niched and most often complemented 
by a very broad range of other identity ‘accents’. Whenever 
specific identity diacritics are isolated in interaction, they 
are part of a pattern of generic argumentation that demands 
careful analysis. I have therefore not hocus-pocussed these big 
diacritics away, obfuscating racism, sexism and other forms 
of social category abuse. I have given them, I believe, a very 
precise location in social action enabling extremely accurate 
analysis, which should protect us from loose generalization or 
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over-interpretation. For as Dell Hymes rightly proclaimed: ‘It 
is no service to an ethnic group to right the wrong of past 
exclusion by associating it with shoddy work’ (1996: 80).
At the end of the road, the theories I have proposed all 
revolve around one thing: enabling an accurate description 
of people’s place in society – of who they are, what they are 
capable of doing, what they effectively do, and what their 
actions produce in the way of social effect. I consider this a 
matter of social justice: a science that neglects, marginalizes 
or dismisses as irrelevant important parts of what people 
are and do, is a science doomed to generate a deeply flawed 
image of society. And a governance based on such science 
is bound to discriminate, incriminate and exclude, which 
explains my rejection of Rational Choice and related theories 
as fundamentally flawed instances of sociological imagination, 
contradicted by all available sociolinguistic evidence. The 
sociological imagination, we should keep in mind, is a 
tremendously important and extraordinarily potent political 
tool; theoretical critique and theoretical reconstruction, 
therefore, are exercises of substantial ‘applied’ relevance.
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